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Roger J. Goebel

Abstract
This Article will initially discuss the genesis of the Stability and Growth Pact (“SGP”) in
1996-1997. The second section will analyze the legal structure of the legislation adopted in 1997
to enforce the stability aspect of the SGP, i.e., the Multilateral Surveillance Regulation (“MSR”)
and the Initial Excessive Deficit Regulation (“EDR”). Next, the Article will briefly review the
operational disputes over the application of the EDR to France and Germany in 2002-2003, culminating in the impasse at the November 25, 2003 Ecofin Council meeting. The following section
will first summarize and then analyze the Court of Justice’s judgment in 2004 in the suit between
the Commission and the Council concerning the Ecofin Council’s failure to take further action
in the proceedings against France and Germany under the EDR, and the Council’s conclusions
taken as an alternative to such action. The principal revisions to the SGP regulations adopted in
2005 will then be briefly described and analyzed. The conclusion will present some reflections on
the lessons to be drawn from the story in this Article, particularly on whether fiscal stability and
economic growth should properly receive equal weight in the SGP.

ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION:
SHOULD FISCAL STABILITY OUTWEIGH
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE STABILITY
AND GROWTH PACT?
Rogerj Goebel*
INTRODUCTION
Developments in the constitutional and legal structure of
the European Community rarely follow a single linear path. The
story of the evolution of the Stability and Growth Pact ("SGP"), a
key policy within the field of coordination of the economic policies of the European Union ("EU") Member States, during the
decade from 1995 to 2005, well demonstrates this.
The SGP represents the confluence of two quite different
policy concerns, for fiscal stability on the one hand and economic growth on the other. At the core of the SGP is a strong
policy commitment made by the European Council at its summit
meeting in Amsterdam in June 1997 at the time when preparations were being made for the commencement of the final stage
of Monetary Union in 1999. In accord with the European Community Treaty ("EC Treaty") provisions on the Economic and
Monetary Union added by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993,1
only Member States that satisfied several crucial economic and
monetary preconditions, commonly called the convergence criteria, 2 could join in the final stage of Monetary Union, transfer* Alpin J. Cameron Professor of Law and Director of the Center on European
Union Law, Fordham University School of Law. The author conveys his thanks to his
research assistant, Eugenia Shlimovich, for her aid in the preparation of this Article.
1. The Treaty of Maastricht, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), signed February 7, 1992 and
effective November 1, 1993, inserted Title VII, Economic and Monetary Policy, articles
98 through 124 (initially numbered as articles 102a through 109m), into the European
Community Treaty. These provisions have been carried over without change into the
current Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, O.J.
C 321 E/37 (2006) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
2. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 121, sets out four convergence criteria: a satisfactorily low inflation rate, commonly coupled with low long term interest rates; a stable
exchange rate; and the avoidance of excessive budgetary deficits. See generally Roger J.
Goebel, EuropeanEconomic and Monetary Union: Will the EMU Ever bTy?, 4 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 249 (1998) (describing the preparations for Monetary Union and the determination
of the eleven Member States that initially qualified to join in the Eurozone).
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ring control of their monetary policy to the European Central
Bank ("ECB") and subsequently adopting the Euro as their currency.' Already in the summer of 1997 it appeared likely that a

large number of Member States would be able to satisfy the convergence criteria. In fact, eleven did so, coming together onJanuary 1, 1999 in the final stage of Monetary Union. This group of
Member States is commonly called either the "Eurozone" or the
"Euro area."4
The Economic and Monetary Union is composed of two
components: a true Monetary Union, whose Member States
transfer control of their monetary policies to the ECB and adopt
the Euro as their common currency, and a system of coordination of the economic policies of all Member States, whether part
of the Monetary Union or outside of it. The EC Treaty provisions on economic coordination, supplemented by legislation
and operational policies, provide for soft law modes of review of
national budgetary conditions, supplemented by a mix of hard
and soft law rules and procedures intended to enforce fiscal stability at the Member State level.
In 1996-97, the German government of Chancellor Kohl was
3. The European Central Bank ("ECB"), created in May 1998, took over control of
the monetary policy of the States joining in Monetary Union on January 1, 1999 in
accordance with the EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 105, 121(4). The Euro was subsequently introduced on January 1, 2002. This Article concerns only the economic coordination ancillary to Monetary Union and not the Monetary Union itself. Professor
Desmond Dinan's text on the European Union ("EU"), DESMOND DiNAN, EVER CLOSER
UNION: AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 481-517 (3d ed. 2005), contains a
valuable chapter on the historical evolution of the Monetary Union. The prominent
economist, Professor Paul De Grauwe, provides an excellent economic overview in PAUL
DE GRAUWE, ECONOMICS OF MONETARY UNION (7th ed. 2005). An interesting study of
the evolution of Monetary Union, concentrating on the political factors, is provided in
MALCOLM LEVITT & CHRISTOPHER LORD, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONETARY UNION

(Neill Nugent et al. eds., 2000). Professor Rosa Lastra provides an excellent current
description of Monetary Union and the role of the European Central Bank in ROSA M.
LASTRA, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STABILITY 173-295 (2006).
Rend Smits, then General Counsel to the Central Bank of the Netherlands, provides a
detailed initial description of the role of the European Central Bank and the evolution
of Monetary Union in REN9 SMITS, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK: INSTITUTIONAL AsPECrS (1997).
4. The term "Eurozone," or sometimes "Euro area," is commonly used to describe
the territory of those Member States, originally eleven in 1998, and presently fifteen,
that have joined in the third and final stage of Monetary Union. Until 2007, the
Eurozone was comprised of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece (since
2001), Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Slovenia
joined the Eurozone on January 1, 2007, while Cyprus and Malta did so on January 1,
2008.
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concerned that some States thatjoined the Eurozone in the final
stage of Monetary Union might subsequently adopt lax budgetary policies that would harm the overall monetary stability of the
Eurozone. Supported in large measure by the Commission, Germany managed to convince the other States' political leadership
to agree upon a policy commitment initially called the Stability
Pact,' which would reinforce the more generally stated rules and
procedures set out in the EC Treaty's economic coordination
provisions. The Stability Pact was to be principally achieved
through the enactment of strict rules and procedures intended
to perpetuate the limits on annual government deficits that represented the key and most difficult condition that States had to
fulfill in order to attain the final stage of Monetary Union and
join the Eurozone.6 However, by the time of the June 1997 Amsterdam European Council meeting, the French government,
led by President Chirac and the newly elected Socialist Prime
MinisterJospin, together with other socialist and liberal political
leaders, insisted that the Stability Pact contain a growth component, expressing a policy commitment to spur higher employment and growth. Accordingly, in June 1997 the European
Council adopted two distinct resolutions that together constitute
the SGP, namely the Resolution on the Stability and Growth
Pact 7 and the Resolution on growth and employment.8 Thus,
from its outset the SGP has always represented a somewhat awkward fusion of two different and potentially conflicting policy
goals.
Early commentators, undoubtedly influenced by the prevail5. SMITS, supra note 3,. at 84-90, describes the early stages of the Stability Pact.
Hugo Hahn, The Stability Pactfor EuropeanMonetary Union: Compliance with Deficit Limit as
a Constant Legal Duty, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 77 (1998) and Martin Heipertz & Amy
Verdun, The Stability and Growth Pact-Theorizing a Case in European Integration, 43 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 985 (2005), provide analytical studies of the development of the
Stability Pact. FiscAL AsPECrs OF EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION (Andrew Hughes
Hallet et al. eds., 1999) contains several valuable early articles analyzing and appraising
the Stability Pact. THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PAcr: THE ARCHITECrURE OF FIsCAL Pol,
ICY IN EMU (Anne Brunila et al. eds., 2001), contains a series of studies largely supportive of the Stability Pact with little reference to its growth aspect. See in particular the
justification for the Stability Pact presented by the Dutch economist Roel Beetsma in
Does EMU Need a Stability Pact?, in THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT, supra, at 23.

6. See infra Part I.
7. Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, O.J. C
236/1 (Aug. 2, 1997).
8. Resolution of the European Council on Growth and Employment Pact, O.J. C
236/3 (Aug. 2, 1997).
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ing sentiments among the Ministers of Finance in 1997, stressed
the stability aspect of the SGP and made little, if any, reference
to the growth aspect.9 Indeed, Martin Heipertz and Amy Verdun, providing an excellent study of the background of the SGP,
conclude that the growth aspect of the SGP had more rhetorical
than real value, labeling it a "cosmetic concession" to France.1 °
In contrast, this Article will try to demonstrate that at the level of
the political leadership of the States represented in the European Council, concerns for growth and employment balanced
concerns for fiscal stability in 1997 and thereafter.
In order to give teeth to the stability aspect of the SGP, the
Council adopted in June 1997 two regulations: the Multilateral
Surveillance Regulation ("MSR"),' 1 which provided for a detailed system of economic coordination of all Member States' annual budgets, and the Excessive Deficit Regulation ("EDR"),12
which established substantive and procedural rules intended to
oblige the Eurozone Member States to avoid excessive deficits,
together with a threat that recalcitrant States might be subjected
to serious economic sanctions. Whether those initial rules were
so strict as to be fundamentally flawed and apt to occasional serious difficulties in practice is one of the issues considered in this
Article.
After the Monetary Union was launched on January 1, 1999,
the Commission, led by President Romano Prodi, with Pedro
Solbes serving as the Commissioner responsible for economic
and monetary affairs, zealously assumed its role in the process of
economic coordination under the two SGP regulations. Not surprisingly, the Directorate General for economic and monetary
affairs, headed by Commissioner Solbes, pressed for a strong,
and indeed strict, enforcement of the substantive standards and
procedural rules set out in the two SGP regulations.
When in 2002-03, France, Germany, and Italy either experienced anemic economic growth or fell into recession, their gov9. See, e.g., Marco Buti & Gabriele Giudice, Maastricht'sFiscal Rules at Ten: An Assessment, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 823, 838-42 (2002); Hahn, supra note 5; Niels

Thygesen, FiscalInstitutions in EMU and the Stability Pact, in FiscAL ASPECTS
MONETARY INTEGRATION, supra note 5, at 15.

OF EUROPEAN

10. Heipertz & Verdun, supra note 5, at 1003.
11. Council Regulation No. 1466/97, O.J. L 209/1 (Aug. 2, 1997). See infra Part II
for further analysis.
12. Council Regulation No. 1467/97, O.J. L 209/6 (Aug. 2, 1997). See infra Part II
for further analysis.

1270

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 31:1266

ernments argued for a liberal (or lax) application of the SGP
standards and procedures, pleading the growth concerns of the
SGP. Nonetheless, the Commission, supported by the governments of several smaller States and by the ECB (although, as we
shall see, the ECB has no role in the economic coordination procedures), pressed to enforce the substantive standards of the
EDR, emphasizing the stability aspect of the SGP. a3 In a wellpublicized impasse in November 2003, the Ecofin Council14 declined to follow Commission recommendations that would have
moved the excessive deficit procedures further along toward
sanctions upon France and Germany and instead adopted conclusions that effectively would have permitted France and Germany to progress more slowly toward compliance with the SGP
rules. After some internal debate, the Commission decided that
it must act to enforce what it considered to be the crucial obligations imposed upon the Council and States by the SGP, and accordingly sued the Council. The Court of Justice's July 2004
judgment annulled the Council's November 2003 conclusions,
but its doctrinal analysis provided support for the views of both
the Council and the Commission. 5 Whether the Council or the
Commission gained the most from the Court's judgment is another topic considered in this Article.
Subsequently, after a period of rethinking both in the Commission and the Council, in June 2005, the Council adopted an
Amended Multilateral Surveillance Regulation ("Amended
MSR") 16 and an Amended Excessive Deficit Regulation
("Amended EDR"),'v which were intended to soften the substantive and procedural rules in the light of the operational experience in 2002-04. Whether the amendments to the MSR and
13. See infra Part III.
14. The Council in the composition of Ministers of Economy and Finance is called
the Ecofin Council. The Ecofin Council has jurisdiction over all aspects of economic
coordination, including the adoption of economic policy guidelines. See Resolution of
the European Council of 13 December 1997 on Economic Policy Coordination in Stage
3 of EMU and on Treaty Articles 109 and 109b of the EC Treaty, OJ. C 035/1, art. 1(6)
(Feb. 2, 1998); see also infra text accompanying note 127. For an appraisal of the increased power and influence of the Ecofin Council, see LEVrr & LoRD, supra note 3, at
216-20.
15. See infta Part IV.
16. Council Regulation No. 1055/2005, OJ. L 174/1 (July 7, 2005) (amending the
Multilateral Surveillance Regulation ("MSR")). See infra Part V for further analysis.
17. Council Regulation No. 1056/2005, OJ. L 174/5 (July 7, 2005) (amending the
Excessive Deficit Regulation ("EDR")). See infta Part V for further analysis.
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EDR represent a prudent or an ill-advised compromise, a beneficial move toward a better consideration of relevant economic
factors and sensible flexibility in the operational procedure, or
rather a dangerous weakening of valuable limits on government
profligacy, is a matter of considerable debate among commentators, and will be examined in this Article, but only after a period
of experience in practice will it be possible to make a more definitive and pragmatic appraisal of their merits and deficiencies.
This Article will initially discuss the genesis of the SGP in
1996-97. The second section will analyze the legal structure of
the legislation adopted in 1997 to enforce the stability aspect of
the SGP, i.e., the MSR and the initial EDR. Next, the Article will
briefly review the operational disputes over the application of
the EDR to France and Germany in 2002-03, culminating in the
impasse at the November 25, 2003 Ecofin Council meeting. The
following section will first summarize and then analyze the Court
of Justice's judgment in 2004 in the suit between the Commission and the Council concerning the Ecofin Council's failure to
take further action in the proceedings against France and Germany under the EDR, and the Council's conclusions taken as an
alternative to such action. The principal revisions to the SGP
regulations adopted in 2005 will then be briefly described and
analyzed. The conclusion will present some reflections on the
lessons to be drawn from the story in this Article, particularly on
whether fiscal stability and economic growth should properly receive equal weight in the SGP.
I. THE GENESIS OF THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
A. Treaty-based Economic Coordination: A Constitutional and
Legal Perspective
Because the SGP regulations are based upon the economic
coordination provisions of the EC Treaty, we need initially to
examine these provisions, which establish the constitutional
foundations of the SGP rules. EC Treaty Article 4(1), introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht, states that "the activities of
the Member States and the Community shall include .

.

. the

adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies .

.

. and con-

ducted in accordance with the principles of an open market
economy and free competition."
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In contrast to the federal character of Monetary Union, the
so-called economic union is not really a union. The Monetary
Union can be said to be a true union with federal features, because the Member States that participate in its final phase yield
control of their national monetary policies to the central authority of the ECB and must replace their national currencies with a
single currency, the Euro. a8 As the monetary expert Professor
Rosa Lastra emphasizes, there is no question but that this cession
of control over monetary policy constitutes an important transfer of sovereignty from Member States to the European Community.'" During its nine years of operations, the ECB has in general quite successfully set out its basic monetary policies and established monetary control procedures for the Eurozone, while
the Euro was successfully introduced in 2002 and has since attained the status of a global currency. 2° The national central
banks of the Eurozone States participate in the European System
of Central Banks headed by the ECB, but no longer play
any
2
autonomous role in governing national monetary policy. 1
Decidedly in contrast, the EC Treaty only requires the adoption of a Community economic policy and "the close coordination" of national economic policies. Although the adoption of
Community-wide economic policy guidelines certainly represents an important innovation with considerable impact in practice, it is nonetheless founded on the coordination of the national policies and does not encompass a centralized governance
of national economic policies. In her recent appraisal of the
"hybrid" conjunction of Monetary Union and economic coordi18. The European Central Bank has as one of its "basic tasks" the control of monetary policy of the Community (actually referring to the States in the Eurozone). EC
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 105(2). The EC Treaty grants the ECB the exclusive right to
emit banknotes within the Eurozone. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 106(1). For a current authoritative description of the role, powers, and operations of the ECB, as well as
the legal status of the Euro, see LAsTRA, supra note 3, at 208-42.
19. See LAsTRA, supra note 3, at 199-200; see also Goebel, supra note 2, at 254 ("Such
a transfer of vital power necessarily diminishes the role of national governments to a
significant degree.").
20. Council Regulation No. 974/98, O.J. L 139/1 (May 11, 1998) (regarding the
introduction of the Euro) established the legal framework for the Euro. See Commission Communication, O.J. C 036/2 (Feb. 15, 2003) for a survey of the successful introduction of the Euro on January 1, 2002. See LAsRA, supra note 3, at 227-43 for a
discussion of the legal provisions regulating the Euro and the future of the Euro.
21. See LAs-rRA, supra note 3, at 208-14 for an analysis of the relationship between
the ECB and the national central banks within the European System of Central Banks.
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nation, Professor Imelda Maher contrasts the "highly integrated"
Monetary Union with the "fragmented system of economic governance whose responsibility lies predominantly at the level of
the Member State.

22

Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any truly centralized European Community control over economic policy, in parallel to
the ECB's control of monetary policy, because that would require an enormous cession of sovereignty, due to the close links
between economic policy and fiscal policy, tax collection, social
security and social welfare systems, employment policy, expenditures for national defense and infrastructure, etc. Member
States do not make any transfer of their ultimate sovereign control over their economic policies as such, but only accept obligations to abide by operational modes of cooperation specified in
the Treaty or in rules established pursuant to Treaty provisions.
As we shall see, the Treaty provisions concerning economic coordination provide an important operational role to the Commission, but leave the ultimate decision-making capacity in the
hands of the Council, occasionally under the guidance of the
European Council. Neither the Parliament nor the ECB have
any role to play.
Moreover, the recently signed Treaty of Lisbon, or Reform
Treaty, 23 when ratified, would not alter this. The EC Treaty
(renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union) would include a new Article 5 that empowers the Council to adopt "broad guidelines" and other measures in the coor22. Imelda Maher, Economic Governance: Hybridity, Accountability, and Control, 13
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 679, 682 (2007). SMITS, supra note 3, at 66, describes the end result
to be a "single economic policy" for the Community, but based upon the coordinated
national policies. In a recent re-examination of the role for economic coordination,
Jean Pisani-Ferry ascribes the idea of an amorphous economic coordination, in contrast
to the centralized monetary policy, to the French government during the planning for
EMU. See Jean Pisani-Ferry, Only One Bed for Two Dreams: A Critical Retrospective on the
Debate over the Economic Governanceof the Euro Area, 44J. COMMON MKT.STUD. 823, 826-27
(2006).
23. The Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC") submitted the draft Reform
Treaty to the European Council for review and approval on Oct. 5, 2007. See Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Draft Treaty
amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European
Community, CIG 1/1/07 REV 1 (Oct. 5, 2007). The European Council formally approved the draft text without significant change at its meeting in Lisbon on October 2526, 2007, and it was signed on December 13, 2007, when it was officially designated as
the Treaty of Lisbon. See Treaty of Lisbon, O.J. C 306/01 (2007) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
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dination of Member State economic policies. Noteworthy is the
fact that economic coordination is not listed in the new Articles
2-4, which set out both the exclusive fields of competence of the
EU, and those shared between the EU and Member States. Economic coordination remains sui generis.
The 1989 Delors Report 4 chaired by Commission President
Jacques Delors and consisting of national central bank governors
and economic experts, set out the essential features of the future
Economic and Monetary Union. The Report principally indicated the necessity for Member States to satisfy serious economic
preconditions in order to enter into the ultimate final stage of
Monetary Union (i.e., to join the present Eurozone), and then
set out the basic features of the operational structure of the
Monetary Union. Subsequently, studies by the Commission and
the Community's Monetary Committee (principally representing
national central bank views) provided suggestions for practical
features of both the economic coordination and the Monetary
Union aspects of Economic and Monetary Union.2 5 The 1990-91
Intergovernmental Conference 26 largely followed the principal
structural proposals made in the Delors Report, as supplemented by Commission studies, when drafting the Economic
and Monetary Union provisions that the Treaty of Maastricht inserted into the EC Treaty.
24.

COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF ECON. & MONETARY UNION, REPORT ON ECONOMIC

(1989) [hereinafter DELORS REPORT]. This report, prepared by Commission President Jacques Delors, several prominent economists, and all the ECB governors, set out virtually all of the essential features
of Economic and Monetary Union ("EMU"). Professor Jean-Victor Louis provides a
detailed analysis of the Delors Report in Jean-Victor Louis, A Monetary Union for Tomorrow?, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 301 (1989). LEvrrr & LORD, supra note 3, at 43-62,
describe the political environment of the time of the Delors Report and the critical role
played by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterand in securing its political endorsement.
25. Alexander Italianer, counselor for EMU in the cabinet of President Delors,
provides a careful description of the drafting work before and during the IGC in Alexander Italianer, MasteringMaastricht: EMU Issues and How They Were Settled, in ECONOMIC
AND MONETARY UNION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL POLICY-MAKERS 51 (Klaus
Gretschmann ed., 1993). For a briefer description of the 1990-91 IGC, see Goebel,
supra note 2, at 265-67.
26. Ever since the creation of the European Community ("EC"), only an IGC of
Member State representatives can propose amendments to the EC Treaty for ratification by all the Member States. Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union currently
governs the process for amendments to the Treaties. See Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on European Union art. 48, O.J. C 321/El, at E/34 (2006) [hereinafter EU
Treaty].
AND MONETARY UNION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
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Although it emphasized the need for coordination of national budgetary policies, the Delors Report never envisaged a
true economic union in tandem with a monetary union. In its
coverage of the topic of "economic union" (a rather misleading
term), an influential Commission study, "Economic and Monetary Union," 27 commenced by stating that "[t]here does not
need to be a single economic policy in the same way as for monetary policy, [so] there is not the same need for institution
change[,]" and continued on to say that, in accord with the principle of subsidiarity, "[m]ost economic policy functions will remain the preserve of Member States even in the final stage of
economic and monetary union. ' 2' Both the Delors Report and
the Commission study did mention rather briefly that the Council should have an ongoing ability to set some limits on national
budgets in order to avoid risks to monetary stability within the
Monetary Union once created. Also, in a section on Community
and State cooperation, the Commission study called for the
Commission to adopt "pluriannual economic policy guidelines"
supplemented by "multilateral surveillance of economic policy," 29 thus foreseeing the later role of the Commission under
the MSR.
The term "economic union" does not appear in the EC
Treaty. Rather, Title VII, "Economic and Monetary Policy," commences with Chapter 1, "Economic Policy." Chapter 1 begins
with EC Treaty Article 98 (ex Article 102a)," added by the Maastricht Treaty, which imposes a dual obligation on Member
States, first to "conduct their economic policies with a view to
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community" (which can be seen as an aspect of the general duty of loyalty to the Community set out in EC Treaty Article 10), and sec27. Commission Communication, SEC (90) 1659 (Aug. 21, 1990), at 21, pt. 3 (Economic and Monetary Union); see also Delors report, supra note 24, pt. III (steps toward
economic and monetary union).
28. Commission Communication, supra note 27, SEC (90) 1659, at 21, pt. 3.1
(1990) (principles, objectives and coherence).
29. Id., SEC (90) 1659, at 23, pt. 3.3 (1990) ("Cooperation").
30. The Treaty of Maastricht's detailed provisions on EMU as inserted in the EC
Treaty were all renumbered, without other change, by the Treaty of Amsterdam, O.J. C
340/1 (1997), effective May 1, 1999. For ease in dealing with earlier legislation and
commentary on EMU provisions that use the initial article numbers, it is useful practice
to add a parenthetical reference to the original article number after the current number.
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ondly, to do so "in the context of the broad guidelines" to be set
by the Ecofin Council pursuant to Article 99(2). Article 99 (ex
Article 103), also added by the Maastricht Treaty, bound Member States to "regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern" and to coordinate them in accordance with
31
guidelines set by the Council, acting by qualified majority.
Thus, the EC Treaty now requires all Member States, whether or
not they are included in the final stage of Monetary Union, i.e.,
in the Euro area or Eurozone, to join in a process of economic
policy coordination, a process that certainly influences, and may
restrict to some degree, unilateral national economic decisionmaking. Economic policy coordination is, however, by no means
a form of economic union analogous to the Monetary Union.
Moreover, although achieving national fiscal discipline in order
to avoid adverse effects on the Monetary Union undoubtedly
represented the original policy thinking behind the Treaty coverage of economic policy coordination, over time the economic
coordination has expanded to advance a number of policy goals,
such as the promotion of growth and employment, new research
and technology, and other Lisbon agenda initiatives.
Article 99 sets out the essential mode of a system of annual
multilateral surveillance of national budgets in order to promote
fiscal discipline. Article 99 thus represents the core of the economic coordination aspect of Economic and Monetary Union.
An unusual feature of this coordination of national economic
policy is that Article 99(2) requires the Ecofin Council to submit
its draft guidelines to the European Council for its "conclusion"
on them before the Ecofin Council can give its final approval.
This is one of the rare instances in which the EC Treaty specifically sets a role for the European Council, presumably both because setting these guidelines in some instances may represent a
politically sensitive matter and because the European Council's
conclusion adds political weight to the Ecofin Council's guidelines. The European Council itself cannot give final approval to
the guidelines because the Treaty on European Union ("EU
Treaty") does not give it the capacity to take decisions with legal
force, but only to "define the general political guidelines" of the

31. For an early analysis of the economic coordination required by the initially
numbered Article 103, see SMITS, supra note 3, at 64-74.
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Union, and hence the Community. 2
Article 99(3) requires the Commission to prepare regular
reports on economic developments in each State, as well as in
the entire European Community. Making use of the Commission reports, the Council then is to "monitor" these economic
developments and assess each State's performance in the light of
the initial guidelines set under Article 99(2). Manifestly, this is
only a "soft law" process. As the monetary expert Ren6 Smits
well observes, the use of the term "guidelines" indicates that
these are only recommendations which have no legally binding
effect and are not subject to judicial review by the Court of Justice. He views "compliance [as being] assured through the political process where Member States take each other to task for failing to toe the line commonly agreed." 33 As is typical in decisionmaking within the Economic and Monetary Union, Article 99(2)
stipulates that the Parliament is only to be kept informed by the
Council and has no role in the shaping of the guidelines3 4 (although in practice its Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee regularly reviews developments in the economic coordination process). Incidently, the Treaty of Lisbon would not
change this. Its new Article 5 on economic coordination, mentioned previously, accords only the Council the power to adopt
guidelines and other measures-the omission of reference to
the Parliament is undoubtedly deliberate.
Promptly in 1994, the Community began the coordination
of national economic policies. Already in late 1993 the Council
had adopted a series of technical regulations and decisions making more precise the application of the Treaty provisions on
avoiding excessive government debt and on calculating a State's
financial resources. 3 In 1994, the Council for the first time is32. Article 4 of the EU Treaty, supra note 26, stipulates that the European Council's role is to provide the Union with "general political guidelines."
33. SMITS, supra note 3, at 70.
34. Professor Jean-Victor Louis has observed that the failure to include Parliament
in the process prevents any "effective inter-institutional dialogue for the elaboration of
the guidelines." Jean-Victor Louis, Perspectives of the EMU after Maastricht, in
AND MONETARY INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

FINANCIAL

1, 7 (Jules Stuyck

ed., 1993).
35. See Council Regulation No. 3605/93, O.J. L 332/7 (Dec. 31, 1993). For a
description of related action, see COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVIITH
GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1993, at 18-19,
22-24 (1994). Also see Council Recommendation of 11 July 1994 on the broad economic guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Commu-
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sued guidelines to specific Member States for modification of
their economic policies. Also, the Treaty ban in Article 104 (ex
Article 104c) on direct financing of government deficits by central banks (popularly referred to as the "no bail-out clause")
came into effect on January 1, 1994.36
Pursuant to Article 99 (2), every year the Commission makes
a review of economic conditions in the entire Community, covering a three-year period since 2003. The Commission then recommends guidelines to the Council, which in turn formulates a
draft text for the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines ("BEPG").
The Council submits the draft BEPG to the European Council,
which gives its "conclusions" on them, after which the Council
formally adopts them. Over the last decade, the BEPG have become progressively more comprehensive and detailed. The
BEPG not only provide a valuable review of the Community's
economic health, growth, and development (rather like an International Monetary Fund ("IMF") or Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") study), but
also set out a series of specific recommendations for the implementation of single market legislation, the promotion of new
technology and business entrepreneurship, labor market reforms, etc.

7

We shall note later how the BEPG have become

linked to the programs to promote employment and job creation. We shall also observe that the Commission evaluations of
each State's annual and multi-annual budgetary programs specifically include an examination of their compatibility with, or
deviation from, the BEPG.
B. Treaty-based Rules on Avoiding Excessive Deficits
The economic coordination provisions of Articles 98-99 are
supplemented by Article 104 (ex 104c), which defines the basic
nity, O.J. L 200/38 (Aug. 3, 1994). For a brief description of this on-going process in
the mid 1990s, see SMITs, supra note 3, at 70-74.
36. SMITS, supra note 3, at 75-77, describes Article 104 as a critical prohibition of
dangerous national government economic behavior. See also LASTRA, supra note 3, at
251-53.
37. For a brief description of this process and the nature of the Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines ("BEPG") themselves, see DINAN, supra note 3, at 511, and LAsr-rR,
supra note 3, at 250-51. For a critical view that the BEPG are "fuzzy" and provide "far
too many guidelines to deliver a selection of priorities," see Pisani-Ferry, supra note 22,
at 836.
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nature of an excessive national annual budgetary deficit"8 and
then sets out the elements of a procedure for Commission recommendations and Council action to confront any Member
State's excessive deficit, including the possibility of sanctions for
States that refuse to comply with Council recommendations
aimed at eliminating excessive deficits.
Initially, we should observe that avoidance of an annual excessive deficit constituted the "make or break" condition for a
State's entry into the final stage of Monetary Union, thus becoming a part of the Euro area." The other economic preconditions, or convergence criteria 4°-achieving relatively low inflation and low long term interest rates, and maintaining stable
currency exchange rates-were always likely to be capable of attainment by most States, but not this one. EC Treaty Article 104
(ex Article 104c), which obligated Member States to "avoid excessive government deficits," was supplemented by Article 1 of
the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, which set the
basic standard of a ceiling on the annual deficit at 3% of annual
GDP, accompanied by a ceiling on total accumulated governmental debt at the level of 60% of annual GDP. 4 The Protocol
target figures were set in October 1991, based upon recommendations from the Monetary Committee,4 2 which apparently used
the then-prevailing medians for Member State annual deficits
and accumulated government debt. There does not appear to
be any authoritative economic rationale for selecting either figure. In his economics text on Monetary Union, the leading Belgian economist Paul de Grauwe flatly states that using the 3%
38. For an initial analysis of the deficit limits and procedure in Article 104 (ex
Article 104c), see SMITS, supra note 3, at 78-83, and LASTRA, supra note 3, at 254-58.
39. See Goebel, supra note 2, at 305-06.
40. The convergence criteria are set out in Article 121 (1) of the EC Treaty, supra
note 1. Apart from avoiding excessive deficits, they are 'the achievement of a high
degree of price stability," established by a low inflation rate; maintenance of stable currency exchange rates for at least two years; and maintaining low long-term interest rate
levels. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 121(1). SMITS, supra note 3, at 121-27, provides a
detailed analysis of the convergence criteria. Goebel, supra note 2, at 303-06, gives a
briefer summary. The well-known American economist, Peter Kenen, appraises the
convergence criteria in Peter B. Kenen, The Transition to EMU: Issues and Implications, 4
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 359 (1998).
41. For an early analysis of Article 104 and the Protocol, see Alexander Italianer,
The Excessive Deficit Procedure: A Legal Description,in EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY
UNION: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 189 (Mads Andenas et al. eds., 1997).
42. See Goebel, supra note 2, at 305; Italianer, supra note 25, at 82.
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figure as a limit for the budget deficits "has no valid scientific
basis."4
In point of fact, the decision of the Council in May 1998," 4
in its extraordinary composition of heads of state and government, which concluded that eleven States satisfied the Treaty
and Protocol standards, and could therefore join in the launch
of Monetary Union in 1999, certainly represented a very liberal
(or lax) appraisal.4 5 France and Italy narrowly managed to avoid
exceeding the 3% annual deficit figure only by extraordinary
and somewhat controversial revenue and tax measures, e.g., the
famous "Euro-tax," adopted by Prime Minister Prodi's government in Italy as a one-time-only tax to enable Italy to come close
to balancing the 1997 budget, and France's inclusion of proceeds from privatization of its state telecommunication company
as ordinary government revenue, enabling France barely to hit
the 3% deficit target.4 6 Moreover, both Belgium and Italy had
an aggregate government debt level of over 120% of GDP; several other States had levels considerably in excess of 60%; and
Germany's total government debt actually increased in 1997, exceeding the 60% level.4 7 Nonetheless, relying upon reports
from the Commission and the European Monetary Institute, the
Council decision concluded that all were making satisfactory
progress toward attaining the Protocol's 60% of GDP target,
making use of EC Treaty Article 121(2), which authorizes the
Council to use its discretion in assessing each State's satisfaction
of the convergence conditions.
In a recent article presenting a decidedly revisionist view to
the effect that Germany was continuously outmaneuvered by
43. See DE GRAUwE, supra note 3, at 243.
44. Council Decision No. 98/317/EC, O.J. L 139/30 (May 11, 1998).
45. Professors Paul Beaumont and Neil Walker vigorously express the view that the
Council decision represented a lax application of the excessive deficit criterion in Paul
Beaumont & Neil Walker, The Euro and European Legal Order, in LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF
THE SINGLE EUROPEAN CURRENCY

169, 174-75 (Paul Beaumont & Neil Walker eds.,

1999).
46. DINAN, supra note 3, at 500-05, describes the strenuous efforts of France, Germany, Italy, and other States to satisfy the 3% deficit criterion. In fact, France's deficit
was marginally above 3%, but still deemed not to exceed the criterion. Also see LEvrrr
& LORD, supra note 3, at 66-71, which notes the Prodi government's extraordinary success in gaining support for its "Euro tax."
47. See DINAN, supra note 3, at 504; see also Beaumont & Walker, supra note 45, at
175. The Netherlands' aggregate debt level was 72% of GDP, while Austria, Ireland,
and Spain were in the 66-68% range. See DINAN, supra note 3, at 504.
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France in the discussions over the fiscal stability provisions of the
Maastricht Treaty, two Dutch academics, Mathieu Segers and
Femke Van Esch, argue that France and Italy proposed that the
3% and 60% of GDP standards should not be "applied mechanically," but rather that the Council should be able to use its
discretion. The Intergovernmental Conference accepted the
French and Italian proposals and drafted accordingly the text of
Article 121, as well as Article 104(2), which authorizes the Commission to evaluate whether a State's deficit is "close to the reference value" and its total debt is "approaching the reference
value at a satisfactory pace." Segers and Van Esch conclude that
"in direct opposition to the wishes of the German financial elite
...the rules [of Article 104] were thus not strictly quantitative,
not binding and entirely intergovernmental. '4 8 Certainly it is
hard to dispute that the decision of the EU's political leaders,
acting through the Council Decision of May 1998, to include so
many States in the final stage of Monetary Union represents as
much a political determination as one based solely on economic
criteria.4 9
In view of the decidedly generous determination that so
many States could qualify to join in the final stage of Monetary
Union, the EC Treaty provisions and subsequent legislation on
the avoidance of excessive deficits take on added importance.
EC Treaty Articles 104(3) to (13) prescribed a procedure for review by the Commission and the Council of the situation of a
State with an excessive deficit, including a Council power to recommend corrective measures, followed by the possible imposition of sanctions on a recalcitrant State."0 Although Article 104
may have been intended to be chiefly applied during the period
of progress toward Monetary Union, 1994-98, and then supple48. Mathieu Segers & Femke Van Esch, Behind the Veil of Budgetary Discipline: The
PoliticalLogic of the Budgetary Rules in EMU and the SGP, 45 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 1089,
1101 (2007).
49. LEwirr & LORD, supra note 3, at 78-79, describes the decision to enable eleven
States to commence the Monetary Union as a purely political one intended to avoid
rancor and discord by permitting as many States as possible to be included. Political
scientist Thomas Willett pithily observes that strict application of the convergence criteria was "abandoned in all but rhetoric," replaced by "numerous 'fiddles,' including by
Germany itself." Thomas D. Willet, A PoliticalEconomy Analysis of the Masstrichtand Stabil-

ity Pact Fiscal Criteria, in FiscAL

ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION, supra

note 5, at 40.
50. For an early authoritative analysis of Article 104, see SMITS, supra note 3, at 78-
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mented by more precise legislative rules, it is worth emphasizing
that Article 104 is not limited in time (and indeed was the principal basis for the Court of Justice's analysis in the 2004 proceeding discussed in Part IV of this Article). Article 104(14) authorizes the Council to adopt measures that could set more detailed
rules to supplement the Excessive Deficit Protocol. The Council
acts by a qualified majority vote, based on an initial Commission
proposal, after consulting the Parliament.
Thus, the roots of the SGP's provisions on the avoidance of
excessive deficits are solidly founded in the EC Treaty itself.
This generates an immediate reflection. Cautious lawyers may
well be concerned whenever legal rules are adopted to freeze a
prevailing economic view into a regulation. Expressing this concern in the related context of the EC Treaty's enunciation of
price stability as the primary objective of the ECB, Bonn Professor Mathias Herdegen has well said:
It is not with great ease that constitutional doctrine approaches principles that place restraints on majority rule in
the interest of economic wisdom. Economic wisdom is what
economic science in a given moment suggests as economically sound. Freezing institutional rules and substantive principles on this basis implies an obvious risk which is inherent
in all dictates of economic wisdom: subsequent falsification
by new empirical messages or by scenarios which have not
been anticipated."
Professor Herdegen's sensible caveat appears to be wellfounded also in the context of the SGP. As we have already
briefly indicated, the initial SGP regulations largely followed the
economic views of the then conservative German government of
Chancellor Kohl. The German government presumably expected that its own economic prosperity would continue, while
the burden of compliance with the rules would fall principally
on the weaker economies of the Mediterranean States. As we
will also see, economic conditions radically changed by 2003,
when France, Germany, Italy, and other States were experiencing either a recession or quite anemic growth and, not surprisingly, simultaneously were incurring annual budget deficits in
51. Matthias J. Herdegen, Price Stability and Budgetary Restraints in the Economic and
Monetary Union: The Law as Guardianof Economic Wisdom, 35 COMMON MKT. L. Rv. 9, 9
(1998).
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excess of the mandatory limits. This occasioned a political crisis
in Community leadership, when the Ecofin Council proved unable to agree upon procedural action to exert further pressure
upon France and Germany to reduce their deficits. This political crisis might have been avoided if the initial EDR had been
based upon economic views that permitted greater flexibility in
the political decision-making process. After a critical reexamination of some of the stricter provisions of the EDR, the Commission and the Council were able to agree upon the adoption of
the amended EDR in July 2005. Reflecting a significant shift in
economic views, this amended text enables the Commission and
the Council to consider many new budgetary and economic factors when providing each one's evaluation of a State's fiscal condition in application of the SGP, and gives the Ecofin Council
more flexibility in its decision-making. Altogether, this entire
episode provides support for Professor Herdegen's caveat that
embodying prevailing economic views into binding legal standards can prove decidedly risky when either factual circumstances or the prevailing views change.
C. The Stability Aspect of the Stability and Growth Pact
Returning to our discussion of the genesis of the SGP, the
European Council session at Madrid in December 1995 provided
decisive momentum toward achievement of Economic and monetary Union through its decision to adopt a scenario for legal
and political action. 52 The European Council instructed the political institutions to adopt in 1996-98 all the legislation necessary
to enable the final stage of Monetary Union to commence on
January 1, 1999. Accordingly, in 1996-97, the Commission and
the Council worked intensively on the legislation to enable the
launch of Monetary Union and the Euro, as well as on the SGP
legislation.
By the time of the Madrid European Council session, the
political leaders of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece had firmly
committed their nations to meeting the convergence criteria to
enter the final stage of Monetary Union. Consequently, the German government of Chancellor Kohl had to confront the likeli52. See E.U. BuLL., no. 12, Annex I (1995) ("The Scenario for the Changover to
the Single Currency"). For a summary of the European Council's scenario, see Goebel,
supra note 2, at 309-10.
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hood that the Eurozone would include several States outside the
core group of France, Germany, and the Benelux nations that
Germany had presumably anticipated in 1990-91. The German
Minister of Finance, Theo Waigel, was determined to ensure that
legislation be adopted to require States to maintain fiscal discipline after they succeeded in joining the final stage in 1999.1'
The German government's particular concern was that EC
Treaty Article 104 lacked a clear timetable for the procedural
steps intended to eliminate a State's excessive deficit and did not
provide for a relatively automatic outcome in the form of a serious sanction for recalcitrant States. The Kohl government was
also concerned that the German voting public should not perceive that the cherished Deutschmark would be replaced with a
much weaker Euro.5 4 Professor Amy Verdun and ECB staff
member Martin Heipertz have recently provided a detailed study
of the political circumstances in Germany prompting the Kohl
government to adopt such a strong line, including the pressure
exerted by the Bundesbank, whose views always had a great influence on public opinion.5 5
Finance Minister Waigel launched discussions in the Ecofin
Council with a paper, "A Stability Pact for Europe," in November
1995.56 The paper included far-reaching proposals, notably the
creation of a special European Stability Council with the power
to adopt sanctions against States that violated excessive deficit
rules, which would have required either amendment of the
Treaty or else a separate convention for Eurozone States. Not
surprisingly, these were seen as extreme and unrealistic, and
53. See LEVITr & LORD, supra note 3, at 71; SMrrs, supra note 3, at 84-85. The
prominent Danish economist, Niels Thygesen, provides an economic argument for the
SGP's establishment of budgetary limits, backed by sanctions, in Niels Thygesen, Fiscal
Institutionsin EMU and the Stability Pact, in FIscAL ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION,

supra note 5, at 15.

54. See Hahn, supra note 5, at 79.
55. See Heipertz & Verdun, supra note 5, at 992-93. Heipertz and Verdun provide
further analysis in Martin Heipertz & Amy Verdun, The Dog That Would Never Bite? What
We Can Learn from the Origins of the Stability and Growth Pact, 11J. EuR. PUB. POL'v 765,
769 (2005). Juergen Stark, Genesis of a Pact, in THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT, supra
note 5, at 77, and Declan Costello, The SGP: How Did We Get There?, in THE STABILITY
AND GROWTH PACT, supra note 5, at 106, also provide historical perspectives, largely
from the German point of view.
56. Finance Minister Waigel's November 10, 1995 paper is summarized in SMrrs,
supra note 3, at 84-86; Hahn, supra note 5, at 80-81; Stark, supra note 55, at 83-87; and
Segers & Van Esch, supra note 48, at 1102.
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soon abandoned. 7 However, the Council at Florence in June
1996 endorsed an initial Ecofin Council report on the policy approach of a Stability Pact, which then provided the basis for fur58
ther deliberations.
Influenced by German views, the Commission's initial October 18, 1996 proposal for an excessive deficit regulation 51 to
carry out the Stability Pact was relatively rigorous, both in establishing a procedural timetable and in setting the sanctions.
However, by that time President Chirac and his then conservative Prime Minister, Alain Juppe, had become greatly concerned
about the unpopularity of the austerity measures needed to ensure that France would enter the final stage of Monetary
Union.6" Heipertz and Verdun accurately conclude that the
French "public identified the unemployment problem as being
caused by the conservative government's stance on fiscal austerity and structural reform" in order to join Monetary Union.6 1
Accordingly, the two French leaders did not welcome the strict
formulation of the legislative draft. As Professor Dinan has well
observed in his excellent text on the EU, "the proposed stability
pact caused a political storm."6 2 He notes that France and other
States were unwilling to accept an excessive deficit regulation
that would rigorously enforce budgetary discipline, especially
one with large and near-automatic financial sanctions.
The European Council meeting at Dublin in December
1996 managed to achieve a compromise policy solution (for
which considerable credit should be given to the Irish presidency). The European Council concluded that the Stability Pact
should be transformed into a Stability and Growth Pact, 63 with a
57. See SMITS, supra note 3, at 85-86. Segers and Van Esch indicate that the Dutch
Prime Minister Wir Kok, who served as President of the European Council during the
final stage of drafting of the Treaty of Amsterdam in early 1997, opposed any treaty
revision of this sort. See Segers & Van Esch, supra note 48, at 1102. The Commission
also had serious reservations about the German proposals. See Costello, supra note 55, at
107-08.
58. See E.U. BuLL., no. 6, pt. 1.4 (1996). Apparently the European Council did
little more than note the report, without discussion. See Hahn, supra note 5, at 86.
59. Proposal for a Council Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, O.J. C 368/12 (Dec. 6, 1996).
60. See DINAN, supra note 3, at 499; LEV1Tr & LORD, supra note 3, at 67.
61. Heipertz & Verdun, supra note 5, at 993.
62. DINAN, supra note 3, at 499.
63. See E.U. BuLL., no. 12, pt. 1.3 (1996). "France (wanted a] signal that stability
would not come at the expense of economic growth, which is why the word 'growth' was
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concern for the promotion of economic growth and employment as well as the initial emphasis on continued fiscal and
budgetary stability. As we shall see later, the European Council
had been concerned with the promotion of faster growth and
the reduction in high unemployment levels already for several
years. The Dublin European Council issued an important policy
declaration in this context, "Growth and Employment in Europe-The Way Forward."64
The European Council also accepted the Ecofin Council's
report,6 5 which stated that the maximum annual budgetary deficit ceiling of 3% of annual GDP, set in the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure introduced by the Maastricht Treaty,
should continue as the standard with which all Eurozone States
must comply. The report followed the approach set out in EC
Treaty Articles 104(9) to (11) in stating that the Ecofin Council

would have the power to take a decision to impose sanctions,
initially a non-interest bearing deposit and ultimately a fine, after the Council itself had made recommendations to a State that
failed to meet the standard, without ultimately securing the desired rectification of the deficit. However, there was still no consensus on certain procedural issues, notably on how close to automatic the sanction procedure would become.
The Commission promptly presented new legislative proposals to achieve the SGP. In the spring of 1997, under the leadership of the Dutch Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm, the Ecofin
Council debated the draft EDR and revised it to some extent,
notably to delimit more precisely what economic circumstances
could excuse an excessive deficit. Some of the key compromises
were reached in bilateral negotiations between Germany and
France.66 (Incidentally, although the Parliament was consulted
upon the EDR,6 7 its views were apparently not a significant factor
added to the Pact." Heipertz & Verdun, supra note 5, at 990; see also LEVTr & LoRD,
supra note 3, at 72.
64. See E.U. BULL., supra note 63, pt. 1.5. This policy declaration is discussed infra
in the text accompanying notes 92-94.
65. See E.U. BULL., supra note 63, Annex I, pt. II. The report is described in SMITS,
supra note 3, at 87-89. Heipertz & Verdun, supra note 55, at 770, describe key compromises reached in the Ecofin Council meeting in Dublin, running in parallel with the
European Council sessions. Stark, supra note 55, at 95-101, describes the progress in
the discussions in fall 1996 and during the Dublin European Council meeting.
66. See Heipertz & Verdun, supra note 5, at 990-91.
67. Parliament's opinion on the initial draft can be found at O.J. C 380/29 (Dec.
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in the evolution of the text.) The codecision procedure1 8 em-

ployed for most internal market legislation, effectively providing
the Parliament with veto power, is not employed for any legislation adopted to create or structure Economic and Monetary
Union. Some commentators consider the Parliament's lack of
legislative power within Economic and Monetary Union to be a
prime example of the "democratic deficit." As Professor Christopher Lord has well observed, "[a]ny [European Parliament]
views on the economic co-ordination mechanisms that are accepted by the Commission are included only in recommendations to the Council, not in legislative texts that constrain
69
choices available to the Member States.
The surprise election of the Socialists in the May 1997
French elections, together with the less surprising decisive vic-

tory of the Labor Party in the United Kingdom earlier in the
spring, significantly modified the political landscape. Prime
Ministers Blair andJospin influenced the final stage of the Inter-

governmental Conference then underway, which ultimately proposed the Treaty of Amsterdam.7 ° Naturally their views also had
to be taken seriously into account in the European Council
16, 1996). Apparently it did not provide a further opinion on the final text. Costello,
supra note 55, at 109, asserts that the Council adopted a few of the Parliament's drafting
suggestions.
68. The legislative procedure known as codecision, initially created by the Treaty
of Maastricht in 1993, and amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, presently
gives the European Parliament equal power with the Council in the adoption of legislation in many fields of EC law. The codecision procedure is currently set out in EC
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 251. For a description of the codecision procedure, see
GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGERJ. GOEBEL, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ELEANOR M. Fox, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 97-99 (2d ed. 2002). Obviously, the failure to use

codecision in the adoption of economic coordination legislation represents a deliberate
decision of the Treaty drafters.
69. Christopher Lord, The EuropeanParliamentin the Economic Governance of the European Union, 41 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 249, 253 (2003); see also Jakob de Haan & Laurence Gormley, The Democratic Deficit of the European Central Bank, 21 EUR. L. REv. 95
(1996); Goebel, supra note 2, at 292-94. See generally Jean-Victor Louis, The Project of a
European CentralBank, in FINANCIAL AND MONETARY INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY, supra note 34, at 17.

70. The Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, after amendment by the Treaty of Amsterdam, but prior to the Treaties of Nice
and Athens, can be found at O.J. C 340/173 (1997). The Commission Office for Official Publications published this consolidated version in a brochure in 1997. The influence of the new Labor government in the United Kingdom and Socialist government in
France is probably most evident in the addition of the Social and Employment chapters
to the EC Treaty. See infra text accompanying notes 79 and 95.
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meeting at Amsterdam in June 1997, which concluded the debate on the Treaty of Amsterdam and simultaneously provided
the final endorsement of the SGP. Before turning to the two
Prime Ministers' impact on the growth aspect, we conclude here
the review of the evolution of the stability aspect.
The final text of the EDR, including the ultimate compromise language, is described in Part II of this Article. What needs
underlining at this point is that the European Council at Amsterdam provided a powerful policy endorsement for vigorous compliance with the EDR's provisions, in line with a request of the
Ecofin Council. The European Council's Resolution on the SGP
of June 17, 199771 was obviously intended to be a sort of "soft
law" supplement to the EDR.
The European Council Resolution declares at the outset in
Article 1 that the ultimate goal is the regular achievement by
Member States of annual "budgetary positions of close to balance or in surplus," not simply the avoidance of excessively large
annual budget deficits. This is undoubtedly the most important
substantive policy position adopted in the Resolution. From an
economic point of view, it is manifestly desirable that governments should regularly achieve surpluses in their annual budgets, or incur only modest deficits (as Finland, Ireland, and Luxembourg customarily do), because it reduces the burden of interest on the accumulated government debt, gives greater
flexibility in planning, provides reserves to confront emergencies, etc.
The European Council Resolution also sets out a series of
commitments, both procedural and substantive, to be made by
the Member States as well as by the Commission and the Ecofin
Council. Thus, in Articles 3 to 5, the States committed themselves to take "corrective budgetary action" after receiving a
Council recommendation to that effect, and to "correct excessive deficits" within one year, while the Council was supposed to
be "committed to a rigorous and timely implementation of all
elements of the Stability and Growth Pact" and prepared "always
to impose sanctions" on any recalcitrant State that would not
correct an excessive deficit despite Council recommendations.
71. Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, supra
note 7. The Resolution was foreseen in the December 1996 Dublin European Council
conclusions. See E.U. BULL., supra note 63, pt. 1.3.
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In a contemporary appraisal, Professor Hugo Hahn termed the
Resolution's commitments to be a "solemn political undertaking," but he immediately added that their weight would depend
on the Council's later "common political resolve to vote accordingly."7 2 The Commission cited the Resolution's strong language in the 2004 Court proceeding between the Commission
and the Council, and the Court of Justice clearly gave due consideration to the Resolution in reaching its judgment.
D. The Growth Aspect of the Stability and Growth Pact
1. The Social and Employment Chapters of the Treaty
We turn now to the evolution of the policy views behind the
Growth aspect of the SGP. The roots of this emphasis on the
coupling of economic growth with higher employment and
strong social cohesion go far back.
The successive Commissions from 1985 to 1995 under President Jacques Delors,7" himself a committed social activist, always
pressed for these goals. We have previously noted that the 198992 Commission headed by President Delors prepared detailed
studies for Economic and Monetary Union and actively advocated it. Simultaneously that Commission also drafted the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights," which was the
subject of public commentary and debate throughout 1989. The
Charter set out a series of rights and principles for both employees and the self-employed, concentrating on those connected
with employment, but also declaring that children, the elderly,
and the disabled possessed certain social rights. After the European Council at Strasbourg in December 1989 provided a nearunanimous endorsement of the Charter, this detailed description of the rights of employed and self-employed persons began
72. Hahn, supra note 5, at 84.
73. Jacques Delors, a prominent French Socialist leader, served as Minister of the
Economy under President Mitterand before becoming President of the 1985-88 Commission. He then served a second four-year term in 1989-92, and a final shortened term
in 1993-95, before the new five-year Commission term was introduced. Professor
Desmond Dinan's history of the European Community and European Union, DESMOND
DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION 206-64 (2004), repeatedly describes the influence of President Delors when discussing the Commission's initiatives
during 1985-94.
74. Commission of the European Communities, Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, COM (89) 471 Final (Oct. 1989). It is often simply called the
Social Charter.
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to exert a strong influence on Community policies.75 Thus, the
Commission's 1989 Social Action Program 6 proposed almost
twenty new directives in the social and employee rights field,
many intended to achieve rights set out in the Social Charter
(e.g., appropriate limits on work time duration, protection of
pregnant workers and adolescents, employee information, and
consultation procedures), almost all of which have subsequently
been adopted.
Although the United Kingdom governments of Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major firmly declined to endorse the Charter, Prime Minister Blair's Labor government did so after its
election in the spring of 1997. Given this now-unanimous Member State support for the Social Charter, the Treaty of Amsterdam amended the Preamble to the EU Treaty to affirm the EU's
commitment to the "fundamental social rights" set out in the
Charter, 7 effectively making it one of the inspirational sources
for EU action.
Moreover, the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in
1993 marked not only the beginning of efforts to achieve Economic and Monetary Union, but also a heightened priority for
action in the fields of social policy and employee rights. A new
Social Chapter, intended to facilitate the enactment of social legislation, could not be inserted into the EC Treaty due to opposition by the UK government of Prime Minister Major. Through a
crucial compromise, a new Social Protocol was annexed to the
75. The European Council's near unanimous approval of the Charter is reported
in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1989, at 187-88,
394 (1990). The Commission published the Charter in a brochure in 1990, but not in the Official Journal. For
an early analysis of the Social Charter's provisions and its influence on Community
policy, see Brian Bercusson, The European Community's CharterofFundamentalSocial Rights
of Workers, 53 MOD. L. REv. 624 (1990); Roger J. Goebel, Employee Rights in the European
Community: A Panoramafrom the 1974 Social Action Programto the Social Charterof 1989, 17
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 56-73 (1993); and Philippa Watson, The Community
Social Charter, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 37 (1991). For a recent review, see Bruno
De Witte, The Trajectory of Fundamental Social Rights in the European Union, in SOCIAL
RIGHTS IN EUROPE 153 (Grkinne De Burca & Bruno De Witte eds., 2005).
76. Commission Communication, COM (89) 568 Final (Nov. 1989) (concerning
its Action Programme relating to the Implementation of the Community Charter of
Basic Social Rights for Workers). For a description of the Commission's Social Action
Program and its initial proposals, see Goebel, supra note 75, at 73-94. DINAN, supra note
3, at 451-54, provides a more skeptical appraisal of the Social Charter's influence and
Social Action Program.
77. EU Treaty, supra note 26, pmbl.
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EC Treaty, authorizing most employee rights and other social
legislation to be adopted by the Council through a qualified majority vote.78 In an extraordinary device, Article 2 of the Social
Protocol permitted the U.K. to opt out of such legislation's coverage. However, after its election in the spring of 1997, the Blair
Labor government accepted the elimination of the Social Protocol, which accordingly disappeared when the Treaty of Amsterdam was adopted.
The Treaty of Amsterdam then inserted a new Social Chapter,79 slightly modified from the text of the Social Protocol, into
the EC Treaty. Indeed, this revised Social Chapter constitutes
one of the most important substantive changes to the EC Treaty
achieved by the Treaty of Amsterdam. A senior Commission official, Patrick Venturini, has well observed that "[t]he Union ...
can now come to grips with wide-ranging problems such as the
changes resulting from new ways of organizing production and
work . . . [as well as issues concerning] workers' health and

safety, working conditions, and the information and consultation of workers."8 ° Pursuant to the new EC Treaty Article 137,
legislation in most of the likely fields of employee rights and
other social action can be adopted through a Council qualified
majority vote, together with the full participation of the Parliament in the codecision procedure. In practice, a steady flow of
important social legislation has been adopted through use of the
Social Protocol or the new Social Chapter since the early 1990s,
notably the Working Time, Parental Leave, European Works
Council, and Employee Information and Consultation directives.8'
78. The Protocol on Social Policy, annexed to the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Maastricht, permitted all States but the United Kingdom to adopt most types of employee
rights legislation by a special qualified majority vote. See Treaty of Maastricht, supra note
1, Protocol on Social Policy, art. 2. For a description of the Social Protocol and its
application in 1993-97, see DINAN, supra note 3, at 454-56.
79. EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 136-45.
80. Patrick Venturini, Social Policy and Employment Aspects of the Treaty of Amsterdam,
22 Foarn-IAm IN-r'L L.J. S94, S101 (1999). Mr. Venturini served as Counsellor to the
Commission Directorate General for Social Policy and Employment during the drafting
of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
81. Among the most prominent examples of the new wave of employee rights legislation are Council Directive No. 93/104, O.J. L 307/18 (Dec. 13, 1993) ("concerning
certain aspects of the organization of working time"); Council Directive No. 96/34, O.J.
L 145/4 (June 19, 1996) ("on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded
by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC"); Council Directive No. 94/33, 0J. L 216/12 (Aug.
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After the 1992-94 recession provoked unusually high levels
of unemployment in many EU States (notably Finland, France,
Germany, and Spain), reaching a high level of 10.9% average
unemployment in 1994,82 efforts to stimulate higher employment moved to the forefront of EU social policy. Professor Catherine Barnard, a leading EU employment law expert, has well
observed that the high unemployment levels in the mid-1990s
created a new emphasis on growth and employment.8" In her
view, action to reduce unemployment would enable "a significant reduction on the burdens experienced by national social
security systems," as well as help support the steady increase in
the aging population benefitting from pension and welfare
schemes, and promote social cohesiveness, notably by helping to
close the gender gap. 4 Professor Dinan has noted that the severe unemployment in the mid-1990s, close to an 11% average,
represented a political as well as an economic problem for the
EU. As he remarks, "[a]fter all, the single market program and
monetary union had promised to deliver economic growth and
jobs. Instead, the post-Maastricht drive toward monetary union
85
was widely seen to have exacerbated unemployment.
In this context the final Delors Commission took the first
initiative toward a comprehensive program to promote higher
employment and economic growth. The vigorous Irish social
policy Commissioner, Padraig Flynn, deserves much of the credit
for the final Delors Commission's 1993 "White Paper on Growth,
Competitiveness and Employment," which was endorsed by the
Brussels European Council in December. 6 This highly influen20, 1994) ("on the protection of young people at work"); Council Directive No. 94/45,
O.J. L 254/64 (Sept. 30, 1994) ("on the establishment of a European Works Council
.. "); and Council Directive No. 2002/14, O.J. L 80/29 (Mar. 23, 2002) ("establishing a
general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community"). See also the final Delors Commission's policy views in the White Paper, European Social Policy-A Way Forward for the Union, COM (94) 333 Final (July 1994).
82. The Community-wide unemployment rate reached a new high of 10.9% in
1994. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcrrvrnEs OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 1994, at 23,
30 (1995).
83. See CATHERINE BARNARD, EC EMPLOYMENT LAw 106 (2006).

84. See id. at 107.
85. DINAN, supra note 3, at 458.

86. Commission White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment-The
Challenges and Ways Forward Into the 21st Century, COM (93) 700 Final (May 1993).
The European Council's endorsement is reported in E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 8, pt. 1.3
(1993).
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tial study outlined a series of structural factors contributing to
high unemployment, such as the poor functioning of the labor
market, inflexibility in employment policies, high non-wage costs
for employees, and insufficient labor mobility. The Commission
urged both national and Community-wide action to reduce legal, fiscal, and administrative burdens on employment, as well as
improved vocational education and skills training, and measures
to promote labor mobility. Another eminent employment law
authority, Professor Roger Blanpain, has emphasized that the
European Council's endorsement of the Commission's action
plan had "[t]he primary purpose of ... [reinforcing the] competitiveness of the European economy," enabling adaptation "to
a world undergoing unprecedented change in production systems, organization of work and modes of consumption."87 Commenting on the White Paper's thesis that various structural
causes of unemployment needed to be confronted, Siofra
O'Leary has observed that the Commission's proposed solutions
included both a component of measures to achieve labor flexibility and one of action to deregulate inefficient or costly governmental rules handicapping effective business operations.8 8
Building upon the initial base of the 1993 White Paper, the
European Council at Essen in December 1994 mandated a Community-wide cooperative effort by the Member States to promote
economic growth and combat unemployment." 9 (Note that the
German government of Chancellor Kohl, which held the European Council presidency, was then confronting severe unemployment due in part to the collapse of industry in the recently
reunified East Germany.) The Essen summit's priority fields of
action included both new initiatives, such as greater investment
in vocational training and efforts to provide employment opportunities for women and the long-term unemployed, as well as
deregulatory policies, such as the elimination of barriers to occupational flexibility and a reduction in non-wage labor costs.9"
The March 1996 European Council at Turin followed this by
urging the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference to include
87.

ROGER BLANPAIN, EUROPEAN LABOUR

88. See SioFRA O'LEARY,

EMPLOYMENT

LAw 188 (9th ed. 2003).

LAW AT THE

JUDICIAL STRUCTURES, POUCIES AND PROCESSES

EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE:

124-26 (2002).

89. See E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 8-9, pt. 1.3 (1994).
90. See BARNARD, supra note 83, at 107-08; BLANPAIN, supra note 87, at 190-94.
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the topic in its deliberations.9 1 As we previously observed, the
Dublin European Council in December 1996 not only confirmed the insertion of growth into the SGP, it adopted another
important policy statement, "Growth and Employment in Europe-The Way Forward,"9 2 declaring at the outset that "[t]he
fight against unemployment is the prime responsibility of the
Member States but also a priority task of the Union."93 In its
specific "Dublin Declaration on Employment," the European
Council initially proclaimed that "[e] mployment continues to be
the first priority for the European Union and the Member
States," and then linked employment efforts and economic coordination by calling for an "integrated employment strategy, embracing macroeconomic policies and policies of structural reform."9 4

Thus, when the European Council at Amsterdam in June
1997 endorsed the final Intergovernmental Conference text for
the Treaty of Amsterdam, it is not surprising that the EC Treaty
was amended to add a new Title VIII on Employment,9 5 reflecting the policy approach of the Essen agenda. Indeed, the importance of Community action to promote employment is highlighted through the amendment of EU Treaty Article 2 to insert
"a high level of employment" as one of the Union's goals.9 6
Within Title VIII, Article 125 requires the Community to develop "a coordinated strategy for employment and particularly
for promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and
labour markets responsive to economic change."9 7 Thus, although the Member States continue to take the measures necessary to promote job training, job placement, and higher employment, the Community is mandated to take a role in developing
Community-wide improved employment policies and in coordi91. See E.U. BULL., no. 3, at 13-14, pt. 11.3 (1996).
92. See E.U. BULL., supra note 63, at 11, pt. 1.5.
93. Id. The Commission's Green Paper, Partnership for a New Organization at
Work, COM (97) 128 Final (1997), and its communication, Modernizing the Organization of Work-A Positive Approach to Change, COM (98) 592 Final (1998), followed
up on the Essen and Dublin European Council policies.
94. E.U. BULL., supra note 63, at 30, pt. 1.36.
95. Tide VIII of the EC Treaty, supra note 1, regarding employment, was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 30. O'LEARv, supra note 88, at 127,
ascribes the initial proposal for an employment chapter to the then-Socialist government of Sweden.
96. EU Treaty, supra note 26, art. 2.
97. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 125.
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nating State action. To this Article 127(2) notably adds: "the
objective of a high level of employment shall be taken into consideration in the formulation and implementation of Community policies and activities." Article 128 requires the Council and
Commission to make a joint annual report on employment to
the European Council, which shall then adopt conclusions on
the basis of which the Council, by qualified majority vote, shall
draw up guidelines for Member States. The approach is deliberately analogous to that used in the economic coordination provisions of Economic and Monetary Union. Moreover, by Article
129, the Council and the Parliament are authorized to adopt "incentive measures" (although the text does not authorize the
Community to adopt harmonization measures, paralleling the
approach in the education, culture, and health fields,9" where
the Community also may only adopt incentive measures). Overall, the effect of Title VIII on employment is to give treaty force
to the action plan endorsed by the European Council at Essen in
1994, and continued thereafter.
Commenting on the new Title VIII provisions, Commission
employment expert Patrick Venturini observed that Title VIII
"acknowledged that Europe's employment problems are common to all Member States .

.

. [because] European economies

are increasingly interdependent."9" He further noted that the
employment guidelines foreseen by Title VIII were to be linked
to the coordination of economic policy in Economic and Monetary Union, bringing the Union's "macroeconomic, structural,
and labor market policies into a much closer relationship. 1 °0
2. Growth and Employment Initiatives in 1997-2003
It is therefore not surprising that when the European Council in Amsterdam endorsed the SGP, the newly elected Socialist
Prime Minister Jospin of France could successfully urge the
heads of government to adopt a policy statement concerning the
growth aspect of the SGP. As Professor Dinan has observed,
"[c] oncern aboutjob losses had reached the top of the EU's political agenda by the time of the Amsterdam summit, as unem98. See id. arts. 149, 151, 152.
99. Venturini, supra note 80, at S97.
100. See id. at S98.
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ployment in France and Germany peaked at record levels." '
He further notes that President Chirac even "sought to outdo
Jospin in proclaiming the importance of job creation" and that
Chancellor Kohl was becoming increasingly concerned with the
topic as Germany's 1998 elections neared. 10 2
Accordingly, the European Council adopted a Resolution
on Growth and Employment on June 16, 1997.103 Its first article
recalled the Essen European Council conclusions and then
stated that it represented "a new impulse" for "keeping employment firmly at the top of the political agenda" and "strengthening conditions for economic growth and employment opportunities." Article 1 of the Resolution also urged that "it should be a
priority aim to develop a skilled, trained and adaptable
workforce and to make labour markets responsive to economic
change," including comprehensive structural reforms. Article 1
further stated that " [e] conomic and social policies are mutually
reinforcing," and that the goal should be "an economy founded
on principles of inclusion, solidarity, justice and a sustainable environment." The Resolution later declared that the multi- annual employment programs required by the Essen European
Council should be treated as a component of the Treaty-based
coordination of Member State economic policies through the
04
BEPG.1
Although in their study of the evolution of the SGP,
Heipertz and Verdun refer to the inclusion of a growth component as essentially rhetorical, citing a number of respondents to
their research study as considering it a "cosmetic concession to
France,"1 0 5 this appraisal does not seem justified. Even conceding the rather natural emphasis by the Ecofin ministers on the
stability aspect, which is evident in the European Council's Resolution on the SGP, many of the heads of government certainly
were seriously committed to the growth aspect, as is manifested
by the progressive evolution of the employment and growth poli101. DINAN, supra note 3, at 459.

102. Id.
103. Resolution of the European Council on Growth and Employment Pact, supra
note 8.
104. See id. art. 5. Article 6 called for close coordination between the Council's
Economic Policy Committee and its new Employment Committee.
105. See Heipertz & Verdun, supra note 5, at 989 n.8.
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cies endorsed by the European Council since the Essen summit
in 1994.
Notably, a special European Council summit dedicated to
employment at Luxembourg in November 1997, popularly
called the 'Jobs Summit," immediately continued the operational policy emphasis on the growth aspect of the SGP.' °6 The
Luxembourg European Council agreed to put into effect the
provisions of Title VIII, without waiting for ratification of the
Treaty of Amsterdam. The European Council mandated the
commencement of a more systematic and coordinated Community employment policy, including greater cooperative efforts
among the national governments, with annual reviews by the
Commission of National Employment Action Plans (commonly
referred to by the acronym "NAPs").107 This process is obviously
similar to that applied in the multilateral surveillance of economic policies.
The Commission presented draft guidelines for the employment policies in the Member States to the Luxembourg European Council to show how it could assist the States in their development of employment policies. The Commission presented
four priorities for Member State action, each to be adapted to
specific national needs in the annual NAPs. The four priorities
were to improve employability, notably by providing job training
for younger people; to facilitate entrepreneurship, by removing
obstacles to commencing and operating businesses; to encourage job flexibility and adaptability, notably by assisting labor
and management to negotiate agreements to modernize work
organization; and to strengthen equal opportunities for men
and women.' 08 Starting in 1998, the Commission commenced
its advisory role to assist Member States in developing their annual employment policies, especially by providing specific guidelines. 10 9 At its Cardiff meeting in June 1998, the European
Council endorsed for the first time the NAPs for employment
for the Member States, following upon the Commission's guide106. See E.U. BULL., no. 11, pts. 1.2-1.5 (1997).

107. See id. pt. 1.4.
108. BARNARD, supra note 83, at 115-18, and Venturini, supra note 80, at S98-100
provide a detailed summary of this initial Commission contribution to the Jobs Summit.
109. BARNARD, supra note 83, at 116-27, describes the action plan guidelines from
1998 through 2005.
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lines and the Social Affairs Council's evaluations. 110 The European Council at Cologne in June 1999 formally adopted a European Employment Pact in order to achieve intensification of the
coordination process."' Subsequently, the December 1999 Helsinki European Council noted the generally successful implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty's procedure for guidelines
1 12
for employment policies in each Member State.
In December 1997, shortly after the adoption of the SGP,
the European Council in Luxembourg emphasized the necessity
for enhanced economic coordination after the start of the final
stage of Monetary Union. The European Council urged that the
Ecofin Council's economic policy guidelines should be "more
concrete and country specific" and should pay "more attention
... to improving competitiveness, labour-, product- and servicesmarket efficiency, education and training, and to making taxation and social protection systems more employmentfriendly."' 13 (Note that this December European Council came
shortly after the November Job Summit's concentration on employment policy.) Immediately before the launch of the final
stage of Monetary Union in the Eurozone States, the European
Council at Vienna in December 1998 endorsed an Ecofin Council report on economic policy coordination. This is notable for
its addition of further fields for review in the coordination process, including the close examination of [NAPs] and the monitoring of Member States' structural policies in labour, product
and services markets." 4 Thus, the link between the procedures
for economic coordination and those intended to promote employment and growth, the two aspects of the SGP, both essentially soft law in character, became well established in the 19982002 period." 5
The now-famous Lisbon agenda for achieving a high level of
110. See E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 8, pt. 1.6.12 (1998).
111. See E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 111, pt. 1.2.4 (1999); see also BARNARD, supra note 83,
at 131-32.
112. See E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 11, pt. 1.12 (1999).
113. E.U. BULL., no. 12, pt. 1.19 (1997).
114. See E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 10, pt. 1.5 (1998).
115. For a thoughtful appraisal of the soft law economic and employment policy
coordination at this time, see Wolfgang Wessels & Ingo Linsenmann, EMU's Impact on
National Institutions: Fusion towards a 'Governancel conomiqud' or Fragmentation?, in EURoPEAN STATES AND THE EURO: EUROPEANIZATION, VARIATION, AND CONVERGENCE 53 (Kenneth Dyson ed., 2002).
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global competitiveness by 2010, entitled "Employment, Economic Reform and Social Cohesion," adopted by the European
Council at its spring meeting in 2000 at Lisbon,1 16 also reflects
the emphasis on a growth strategy. The European Council declared that it was setting the "strategic goal" for the EU to become "the most competitive and knowledge-based economy in
the world, capable of sustainable economic growth," and then
continued, "with more and better jobs and greater social cohe'
sion." 117
Although the Lisbon policy program had its principal
focus upon enhanced research and technology development,
the elimination of regulatory barriers to economic growth and
the creation of innovative businesses, and the reform and restructuring of fiscal and social policies, it also included a major
component of policy action to modernize "the European social
model" and to stimulate greater and better employment oppor18
tunities.
The Commission's Social Policy Agenda for the years 2000059 included a concentration on achieving employment opportunities in this broader socio-economic context, with particular
reference to the challenges represented by the development of a
knowledge-based economy, by enlargement, and by economic
globalization. Not only did the European Council at Nice in December 2000 endorse the Commission's Social Policy Agenda, it
specifically adopted a policy program called the European Social
Agenda, which emphasized the development of a cutting-edge
information-based economy, greater labor mobility, improvement in job education and training, and protection against so1 20
cial exclusion.
Thus, at the time of the adoption of the SGP in 1997 and in
the years immediately following it, there is abundant evidence
116. See E.U. BULL., no. 3, at 8-12, pts. 1.6-1.11 (2000).

117. Id. pt. 1.5. DINAN, supra note 3, at 388-91, describes the political motivations
behind the Lisbon strategy and the Commission's strong support for it.
118. See E.U. BULL., supra note 116, pts. 1.7-1.9, 1.14. BARNARD, supra note 83, at
132-40, analyzes the Lisbon strategy goals of modernizing the European social model
and creating more and better jobs. Also see Silvana Sciarra, FundamentalLabour Rights
after the Lisbon Agenda, in SOCIAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE 199 (Grdinne de Btirca & Bruno de

Witte eds., 2005).
119. Commission Communication, COM (2000) 379 Final (June 2000) (to the
Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Social Policy Agenda).
120. See E.U. BULL., no. 12, Annex I (2000); see also BARNARD, supra note 83, at 133-
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that the European Council was not only committed to the economic policies necessary to underpin the foundation of the final
phase of Monetary Union in 1999, but also to a strategy of
growth and development, marked both by the Lisbon growth
strategy agenda and by ongoing annual and multi-annual policies intended to promote higher employment and better employment opportunities. From 2000 on, the Commission's annual reports on the activities of the EU include sections docu12 1
menting the ongoing efforts to achieve the Lisbon agenda
(always a principal topic at the annual spring meeting of the European Council), as well as the Community-wide and annual
22
NAPs. 1
Since 2002, there has been a deliberate effort to better coordinate the annual employment policy guidelines with the annual
economic coordination provided through the BEPG. Currently
the Commission and the Council jointly prepare a draft Employment Report each January, drawing upon the Member States'
NAPs and adding a collective report on the employment situation throughout the Community. At the March European Council meeting that reviews the Lisbon strategy progress, the European Council also provides conclusions concerning the European Employment Strategy. Subsequently the Commission
reviews the text, picking up suggestions from the Parliament,
and produces draft Employment Guidelines. The Social Affairs
Council adopts the Employment Guidelines, acting by a qualified majority vote, after the June European Council has provided
its endorsement in the form of conclusions. Thereafter, each
Member State adopts a new annual NAP to apply the Employ-

121. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTVITIES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 2005, at 47-49 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 GENERAL REPORT ON THE EU]
(reviewing the Lisbon strategy); EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcmVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 2004, at 10 (2005) [hereinafter 2004 GENERAL REPORT ON
THE EU] (noting that European Council endorsed the Kok report evaluating the progress under the Lisbon strategy, produced by a group chaired by the former Dutch
Prime Minister

Kok);

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF

THE EUROPEAN UNION 2001, at 3-4 (2002) [hereinafter 2001 GENERAL REPORT ON THE
EU]. The Lisbon European Council mandated the annual spring European Council to
review the progress of the Lisbon agenda. See E.U. BULL., supra note 116, pt. 1.5.
122. See, e.g., 2005 GENERAL REPORT ON THE EU, supra note 121, at 89-90 (addressing the impact of the revised Lisbon strategy); 2004 GENERAL REPORT ON THE EU, supra
note 121, at 19-20 (describing a new employment strategy for 2003-2006); 2001 GENERAL REPORT ON THE EU, supra note 121, at 51-54,
112-22.
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ment Guidelines in its national context. 12 1 As we shall see in
Part II, this procedure parallels that followed in the economic
coordination under the MSR.
3. The Role of the Eurogroup
The creation and subsequent operations of the
Eurogroup, 124 composed of the Ministers of Finance of the
Eurozone States, is quite relevant to both the stability and
growth aspects of the SGP. French Prime Minister Jospin is usually given credit for proposing that the Ministers of Finance of
the Eurozone States should hold regular meetings to coordinate
policy.' 2 5 Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the French Finance Minister
at the time, described the Eurogroup's purpose as being "to
match increased monetary interdependence with closer economic and budgetary co-operation," and bluntly observed that
"in the absence of [an alternative] visible and legitimate political
body, the ECB might soon be regarded by the public as the only
institution responsible for macro-economic policy."12
In December 1997, the Luxembourg European Council authorized the Eurozone Ministers of Finance to meet informally
within the structure of Ecofin Council sessions to discuss economic and monetary matters of common concern. However,
the Luxembourg European Council also directed that only the
entire Ecofin Council could take any binding decisions in the
field of economic coordination, stating specifically: "the Ecofin
Council is the only body empowered to formulate and adopt the
broad economic policy guidelines which constitute the main instrument of economic coordination." 127 This represented an im123. BARNARD, supra note 83, at 110-15, and DINAN, supra note 3, at 461-62, describe the mode of preparation of the Employment Guidelines.
124. Initially referred to as the Euro-X group (X representing the ultimate number of Member States in the Eurozone), this soon became known as the Eurogroup. See
DINAN, supra note 3, at 500.

125. Prime MinisterJospin initially wanted an economic governance structure that
could watch over ECB operations and policies, but this proposal was not acceptable to
Germany and other States. The idea of coordinative meetings at the Council level
proved agreeable to the other Eurozone States. See id.
126. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Op-Ed., We're in This Together, FIN. TIMES (U.K.),
Nov. 27, 1997, at 18.
127. E.U. BuLL., supra note 113, pt. 1.9. Jean Pisani-Ferry observes that the United
Kingdom and some other States only "grudgingly" accepted that the Eurogroup could
hold meetings provided that they were informal and lacked the power to take decisions.
See Pisani-Ferry, supra note 22, at 828.
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portant policy decision, because it meant that the States that
would not participate in the third stage of Monetary Union (notably Denmark and the United Kingdom through their opt-out
protocols, and Sweden, which has also in effect opted-out, as well
as the new Member States from Central Europe) would still participate in the Ecofin Council's economic coordination process.
Professor Jean-Victor Louis, the eminent Belgian monetary
expert, has provided an excellent review of the Eurogroup's operational role.12z The Eurogroup meetings are regularly held
immediately prior to the formal Ecofin Council sessions (frequently the day before and at the same site). Reportedly, the
Eurogroup Ministers discuss issues of growth, promotion of investment and export policies, handling the cost of pension benefits and health care, strategies to reduce high unemployment,
etc., all as they concern the Eurozone. The Eurogroup thus effectively pursues a soft law mode of achieving policy coordination within the SGP. As Jean Pisani-Ferry has remarked, the
Eurogroup has gradually been "transformed from a mere talking
shop into what increasingly looks like a policy-making institution," whose decisions are usually enforced by the entire Ecofin
Council.1 29 Professor Louis has well observed that the
Eurogroup meetings have the advantage of being informal, confidential, and comprised of a smaller number of participants
than the full Ecofin Council, but can nonetheless be criticized
for a lack of transparency. 130 To promote continuity, in August
2004 the Eurogroup chose Prime Minister Juncker of Luxembourg, who also acts as his nation's Finance Minister, to serve as
its President.
At its December 2000 session in Nice, the European Council
specifically approved the Eurogroup's role, declaring that its discussions "enhance the coordination of economic policies
[which] will help to boost the growth potential of the Euro
128. SeeJean-Victor Louis, The Euro-group and Economic Policy Co-ordination, in THE
EURO IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT 351, 358-62 (Jean-Victor Louis ed., 2002).

129. Pisani-Ferry, supra note 22, at 840. There have been reports that the
Eurogroup discussions the night before Ecofin sessions deprive the Ecofin meetings of
lively debate, providing virtually "pre-cooked" conclusions. See Chris Smyth & George
Parker, Ministers Seek to Liven Up Ecofin Meetings with Bit of Controversy, FIN. TIMES (U.K.),
Apr. 7, 2006, at 5.
130. See Jean-Victor Louis, The Economic and Monetary Union: Law and Institutions,
41 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 575, 586 (2004).
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area. " 13 t The Nice European Council did not, however, change

the operational caveat that only the full Ecofin Council can take
binding decisions. As Professor Louis has well observed, enabling the Eurogroup to take legally binding decisions is not possible without a modification in "primary Community law," i.e., a
Treaty amendment or protocol, because it would modify the pre1 32
sent institutional structure of the Council.
Time has brought an evolution of views concerning the operational role of the Eurogroup. The recently signed Treaty of
Lisbon, or Reform Treaty, is followed by a Protocol on the
Eurogroup, 13 3 which replicates a draft protocol to the former
draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.1 3 4 The Protocol specifically authorizes informal meetings of the Eurogroup
Finance Ministers. Article 2 of the Protocol also provides that
the Eurogroup shall elect a President for a term of two and a
half years. The Preamble states the motive for the Protocol to be
"to promote conditions for stronger economic growth . . . and
•. to develop ever closer coordination of economic policies
within the Euro area." Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon would
amend the EC Treaty to insert a new Article 115 that would enable the Eurogroup Finance Ministers to "adopt measures specific to [their] Member States," notably to establish their economic policy guidelines and "to strengthen the coordination
and surveillance of their budgetary discipline. 1 3 5 For this purpose only Eurogroup Finance Ministers would have the right to
vote, and a special form of qualified majority should apply.
In concluding this part of the Article, any appraisal of the
genesis of the SGP should recognize that the pact represents a
fusion of two separate policy views, one concerned with maintaining fiscal stability within Eurozone States and the other with
the promotion of economic growth and high employment. In
effect, the strict text of the legislation intended to achieve stabil131. E.U. BULL., supra note 120, pt. 1.17.
132. See Louis, supra note 128, at 359.
133. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 23, Protocol on the Euro Group.
134. Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ. C 310/1, Protocol
on the Euro Group (2004).
135. The Treaty of Lisbon would insert a new Article 114 into the EC Treaty
(whose title would be changed to Treaty on the Functioning of European Union). See
Draft Treaty Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, supra note 23, at 80. This reflects the proposed Article 111-194
in the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, supra note 134.
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ity, notably the initial EDR, may be considered to be appropriately balanced by a policy to achieve growth, including soft law
initiatives and inter-governmental coordination aimed at the
stimulation of higher GDP growth and the reduction of high unemployment levels. With this picture in view, it is easier to understand why the political leaders of France, Germany, and Italy
in the 2002-03 period felt justified in their continued execution
of policies they considered necessary to promote growth and reduce high unemployment, even when that produced annual excessive deficits in violation of the SGP. Before examining these
developments in 2002-03, it is essential to obtain a more precise
idea of the 1997 legislation that embodied the SGP.
II. THE STABILITY PACT LEGISLATION
The stability aspect of the SGP builds upon the initial economic coordination procedures developed under EC Treaty Articles 98, 99, and 104. Since 1997, the SGP has been embodied
in legally binding form in two regulations that are designed to
achieve complementary goals. The MSR, foreseen in EC Treaty
Article 99, is intended to set out a detailed system of regular economic coordination among all the Member States, both inside
and outside of the Eurozone. In contrast, the EDR builds upon
the provisions of Article 104 on avoiding excessive government
deficits by setting standards for future excessive deficits, a procedure for both Commission and Council review of each State's
budgetary status, coupled with recommendations for the elimination of any deficits assessed to be excessive, and a further procedure for the imposition of serious economic sanctions on recalcitrant States, but in this instance, only those within the
Eurozone.
A. The 1997 Multilateral Surueillance Regulation
The MSR, adopted by the Council on July 7, 1997,136 represents the fundamental mode of executing the economic coordination mandated by EC Treaty Article 99. The MSR has never
occasioned serious criticism from political leaders or even from
economists or legal academics, because it is perceived to be
pragmatically quite functional. Professors Fabian Amtenbrink
136. Council Regulation No. 1466/97, supra note 11.
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and Jakob de Haan have provided an excellent analytical appraisal of the initial MSR.13 7 When the MSR was amended in
2005, the modifications were essentially made to complement
the amended EDR by requiring the review of more relevant economic data, rather than to remedy any significant operational
deficiencies.
The MSR sets out the procedures used by the Commission
and the Council to carry out a systematic on-going review of each
State's annual budget and its overall economic performance.
The Regulation builds upon the prior system of economic coordination under EC Treaty Article 99 in effect from 1994 to 1998.
This process of review of each State's budgetary position is inextricably linked to the Community's own BEPG, which the Com138
mission drafts, and the Council ultimately adopts, each spring.
Obviously, when the Commission, and subsequently the Council,
reviews each State's budgetary position in the multilateral surveillance system, it examines the degree to which the State complies with or deviates from the BEPG.
The MSR's first recital, or "Whereas" clause, states:
"Whereas the Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective
of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the
conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth
conducive to employment creation." Manifestly, this references
both the Stability Pact goal of maintaining price stability and the
Growth Pact aspect of promoting economic growth and employment. The second recital specifically refers to the European
Council's Resolution on the SGP, emphasizing that each State
should achieve "budgetary positions of close to balance or in surplus."
The MSR sets out the operational surveillance procedures
for all of the EU's Member States. For those States within the
Eurozone (currently fifteen) 139 the regulation requires the adoption and subsequent review of National Stability Programs, while
for those outside the Euro area (currently Denmark, the United
137. See Fabian Amtenbrink &Jakob de Haan, Economic Governance in the European
Union: Fiscal Policy Discipline Versus Flexibility, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1075, 1079-85
(2003). For a useful earlier review, see Hahn, supra note 5, at 87-92. Two Commission
economic experts provide a valuable review in J. Fischer & G. Giudice, The Stability and
Convergence Programmes, in THE STABIUTY AND GROWTH PACT, supra note 5, at 158.
138. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 4.
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Kingdom, Sweden, and nine of the twelve new Member States)
the Regulation outlines essentially parallel procedures for what
are denominated Convergence Programs. In each case, Article 1
declares the goal of the surveillance is "to prevent, at an early
stage, the occurrence of excessive general government deficits
and to promote the surveillance and coordination of economic
policies."
Article 3 of the MSR requires each State to commence the
process by submitting an annual Stability Program. The National Stability Programs must incorporate a multi-annual component, covering both the data on the prior budget year and the
succeeding three years. Such a medium-term emphasis manifestly promotes better advance planning for a more certain
achievement of the goal of "budgetary positions of close to balance or in surplus." Article 3(2) describes the core of the Stability Programs. With regard to the budget planning (annual and
multi-annual), the Program is supposed to set a goal of a budget
in surplus or slightly under that ("close to balance"), as well as
the budgetary and economic policy measures taken or proposed
to achieve the goal. The national Program must also indicate
"the expected path of the general government debt ratio."
There is, however, no express reference to any obligation to reduce the aggregate government debt, nor even an indication
that a high level of aggregate government debt is to be avoided.
On the economic side, Article 3 provides that the Program
must contain "the main assumptions about expected economic
developments and important economic variables," especially
GDP growth, employment, and inflation. A critical adjunct to
this is a compulsory "analysis of how changes in the main economic assumptions would affect the budgetary and debt position." This is valuable particularly because many governments
may be expected to have a tendency toward excessive optimism
in their economic forecasts. Article 4 requires that the Stability
Programs be submitted annually before March 1, starting in
1999. (In practice, most States prepare their budgets in the fall
and submit them for Commission review by the end of the calendar year.) Article 4(2) also requires that these Stability Programs
be made public, which ensures that opposition party leaders, financial and business experts, and the media can all review and
debate the budgetary policies set out in the government's program.
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Article 5 sets out the basic review process. Within two
months of receipt of a State's Stability Program, initially the
Commission and then the Ecofin Council must provide evaluations of the economic realism of the State's program, with particular attention to whether the program "provides for a safety margin to ensure the avoidance of an excessive deficit." As we observed previously, the Council must evaluate "whether the
economic policies of the Member State concerned are consistent
with the broad economic policy guidelines." The Council concludes its review with a formal opinion to each State, and may
"invite" adjustments to the Stability Program concerned. The
use of the word "invite" highlights the soft law character of the
Ecofin Council opinions, which are not legally binding, even
though they may have considerable political impact.14 °
Article 6 stipulates that the review process continues during
the year with a continued monitoring of each State's program
first by the Commission and then by the Council. In practice,
this means that the Commission's review occurs biannually, with
a second examination in the fall following each State's presentation of updated budgetary data. Following a Commission recommendation, the Council has the power to issue an "early warning" to any State that it perceives to be significantly diverging
from the medium-term budgetary objective, with recommendations for corrective measures. The Council may take a decision
to make its recommendations public, which obviously is intended to create some pressure on the State government concerned. Note that the Council is not bound to endorse a Commission proposal for an early warning and in fact it has not done
so on several occasions, making its own assessment on whether it
is necessary or desirable to issue a warning. 4
A parallel system operates for the States not in the
Eurozone, which must prepare Convergence Programs containing essentially the same budgetary information and policy indi140. See Amtenbrink & de Haan, supra note 137, at 1085.
141. See id. at 1084-85. Amtenbrink and de Haan refer to the Council's refusal to
issue early warnings to Germany and Portugal on February 12, 2002, despite the Commission's recommendation to do so. See id. at 1090; see also infra notes 168, 172 and
accompanying text. On February 10, 2004, the Council also declined to endorse a
Commission recommendation that the United Kingdom receive an early warning due
to its projected 3.3% deficit in its 2003-04 budget year. The Council felt that the United
Kingdom had sufficient "room for manoeuvre" because of its low aggregate debt. See
E.U. BULL., no. 1/2, pt. 1.3.20 (2004).
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cations, again to be evaluated by the Commission and the Ecofin
Council. 14 2 Under Article 10 of the MSR, the Ecofin Council has
the power to "monitor the economic policies of non-participating Member States... with a view to ensuring that their policies
are geared to stability" and may address to them "early warning"
recommendations to take "corrective measures." The Council
may make these recommendations public. Obviously, for the
Central European States desirous ofjoining the Eurozone in the
relatively near future, the preparation and on-going review of
Convergence Programs is quite vital.
In their valuable review of economic coordination via the
MSR, Professors Amtenbrink and de Haan consider it to constitute a prime example of the "open method of coordination"
whose characteristics are: "the recognition of diversity, the
broad participation in policy making, the co-ordination of multilevel government, use of information, benchmarking, peer review and peer pressure, the lack of any particular rule or single
policy objective, as well as structured but unsanctioned guidance
by the Commission and the Council."14' 3 Amtenbrink and de
Haan accurately observe that it is the Ecofin Council, rather
than the Commission, that has the decisive role in evaluating a
State's compliance with the BEPG. Moreover, they also emphasize that the Council is not under any legal obligation to issue an
early warning, even despite the hortatory language of the European Council's Resolution on the SGP. 4 The MSR remains entirely a soft law instrument.
It is worth noting that the Council adopted the MSR acting
through the cooperation procedure with the Parliament, because Article 99(5) required that legislative mode. The cooperation procedure, successfully used in the adoption of most internal market legislation from 1987 to 1993, required the Council
to consider very seriously any amendments proposed by the Parliament and endorsed by the Commission in the so-called "second reading" stage of legislative drafting, because the Council
could only reject such amendments by unanimous action.14 5
142. See Council Regulation No. 1466/97, supra note 11, arts. 7-9.
143. Amtenbrink & de Haan, supra note 137, at 1079. Professors Wessels and Linsenmann provide a similar view in terming the MSR a form of "'soft' coordination."
Wessels & Linsenmann, supra note 115, at 69-70.
144. See Amtenbrink & de Haan, supra note 137, at 1084-85.
145. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 252, sets out the cooperation procedure for
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The Maastricht Treaty replaced the cooperation procedure in
the internal market and most other legislative fields with the
codecision procedure,1 4 6 which effectively gives Parliament an
equal share in the legislative process, but the cooperation procedure still survives in any legislation adopted pursuant to Article
99(5). Incidentally, we should note that the Treaty of Lisbon
would eliminate the cooperation procedure. An amendment to
Article 99(5) would require any further legislation concerning
multilateral surveillance to be adopted through the codecision
procedure (to be renamed the "ordinary legislative procedure"),
thus giving Parliament an equal share in the legislative process.
In Part V of this Article, we will review the amendments
made to the MSR in June 2005, but it should be stressed again
that the MSR has proved to be an extremely valuable instrument
toward achieving a substantial degree of Community-wide coordination of national budgetary policies. The existence of a system of critical review of a State's plans and forecasts by outside
experts certainly tends to promote greater realism and objectivity. The importance and value of peer pressure at the level of
the Ecofin Council also merits underlining.
B. The 1997 Excessive Deficit Regulation
Before examining the provisions of the EDR, it is worth reflecting on its fundamental nature. Adopted on the legal basis
of Article 104(14), the EDR falls within the Treaty chapter on
economic policy. The EDR represents a procedure to achieve
enhanced economic coordination; it is in no way a constituent
part of Monetary Union. As we have previously emphasized, the
economic coordination provisions of the Treaty do not represent a cession of sovereignty over economic governance from
the Member States to the Community.1 47 State governments are
bound to submit their annual and multi-annual budgets for review by the Commission and Council, but they retain autonomous control over their budgets and fiscal conditions. The
ECB's autonomous monetary policy making for States within the
Euro area may be impacted by actions taken by the Ecofin Counadopting legislation. For a description of the procedure, see BERMANN ET
note 68, at 86-87.
146. See supra note 68 for a description of the codecision procedure.
147. See supra text accompanying note 22.

AL.,
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cil in application of the EDR, but the ECB is not even consulted
at any stage in the EDR procedure.
However, although the EDR is situated in the sphere of intergovernmental economic coordination, it has some features
suggestive of hard law. Professors Amtenbrink and de Haan usefully describe it as a form of "closed coordination," composed of
"top-down policy formulation," relatively hard law because it is
based on stipulated rules and sanctions. 14 8 As we shall see, in
2004 the Commission's suit against the Council required the
Court of Justice to examine to what degree the decisions or actions to be taken by the Council pursuant to Article 104 and the
EDR were governed by hard versus soft law.
The EDR initially prescribes the mode by which the Commission can evaluate, and the Council can determine, that a
State has developed an excessive annual deficit. At the outset,
the seventh "Whereas" clause of the EDR's preamble continues
to set the maximum permissible deficit at 3% of annual GDP, in
accord with the EC Treaty Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure. (We should underline at once that the EDR does not
refer to the Protocol's other requirement that a Member State's
aggregate government debt should not exceed 60% of its annual
GDP, nor does it require any on-going review of whether a State
is steadily reducing any excessive aggregate debt to the 60%
level, or impose any sanction for exceeding the 60% level.)

Article 2 of the EDR covers the delimitation of the circumstances that might excuse a State's excessive deficit. Drawing
upon language in EC Treaty Article 104(2), a deficit should be
excused only if it is "exceptional and temporary." Article 2 (1) of
the EDR provides some amplification of the meaning of this language by stating that "an unusual event outside the control of
the Member State concerned ...

which has a major impact on

the financial position" of that State would merit an excuse. Although never precisely defined, the language presumably refers
to natural disasters, such as earthquakes or floods, or wars or
civil wars and insurrections.
The EDR's second basis for excuse in Article 2(1), namely
a severe economic downturn," was the subject of a crucial debate in 1996-97. In their historical review, Heipertz and Verdun
148. See Amtenbrink & de Haan, supra note 137, at 1076. Similarly, Wessels &
Linsenmann, supra note 115, at 57-58, 68-69, describe it as "'hard' coordination."
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observe that Germany wanted a strict definition, while France
sought "more political lenience."1 49 The Commission's October
1996 draft added after "a severe economic downturn" the words
"in particular in the case of significantly negative annual real
growth."15 ° Germany would not accept this rather vague formulation. In their account of how in their view Germany lost the
battle for strict rules in the SGP, Segers and Van Esch state that
France and Italy supported the Commission, and that ultimately
the European Council in Dublin agreed upon a compromise
proposal offered by Belgium. 1 5 ' The Belgian compromise kept
the basic standard of a 2% downturn in GDP, but permitted the
Council to decide that a lesser downturn might still satisfy the
"severe economic downturn" standard.
The final wording of EDR Article 2(2) initially looks like
Germany succeeded in obtaining a strict rule, because it states
that the Commission's evaluation report should consider "a severe economic downturn to be exceptional only if there is an
annual fall of real GDP of at least 2%." It is worth underlining
that a 2% downturn in annual GDP would only occur in a rather
severe recession. Indeed, if any one Member State experienced
a recession at that level, it is highly likely that other States would
also be in a recession as well, either because the recession is being provoked by factors common to several States (such as a
sharp increase in energy costs) or because of a ripple effect
among closely related trading partners.
However, EDR Article 2(3) then gives discretion to the
Ecofin Council to conclude that a fall of less than 2% GDP is
"nevertheless exceptional in the light of further supporting evidence, in particular on the abruptness of the downturn or on
the accumulated loss of output relative to recent trends." Thus,
although Germany sought a strict standard for a "severe economic downturn," the compromise text inserted into the EDR
provides the Council with a fair degree of discretion in its appraisal. Because Germany was not happy with this formulation,
the European Council Resolution on the SGP supplements it by
declaring that the Member States will apply Article 2 (3) only in a
149. See Heipertz & Verdun, supra note 5, at 990.
150. Proposal for a Council Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the implementaion of the excessive deficit procedure, supra note 59, art. 1(2).
151. See Segers & Van Esch, supra note 48, at 1103.
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"severe recession," and stipulating further that "in evaluating
whether the economic downturn is severe, the Member States
will, as a rule, take as a reference point an annual fall in real
GDP of at least 0.75%.152 (The rather curious choice of a
0.75% figure represents a compromise between Germany's desire to use 1% and France's proposal of 0.5% of GDP.)1 53 In
their final appraisal of the EDR language, even when supplemented by the European Council Resolution, Segers and Van
Esch conclude that Germany's effort to achieve a strict, near-automatic rule had failed, as the ultimate formulation represented
only "a gentlemen's agreement-atbest-between the Finance Ministers of the Euro area." 154 While referring to Article 2(3)'s text
as merely a "gentlemen's agreement" is rather an exaggeration,
it is certainly true that the Council has considerable discretion in
its decision making. As we shall see, this is one of the Court of
Justice's key conclusions in the judgment reviewed in Part IV of
this Article.
In Articles 3 through 6, the EDR sets out a complicated procedural timetable. It may help to provide a somewhat simplified
sequence of progressive stages:
1) Commission evaluation of a Member State budget.
2) Commission opinion that a State has an excessive deficit
(EDR Article 3).
3) Ecofin Council opinion that a State has an excessive deficit (EDR Article 3).
4) Ecofin Council recommendations to correct the deficit
(based largely on Commission recommendations, but within the
Council's discretion) no later than the next fiscal year, with the
initial corrective State action to be taken within four months
(EDR Article 3).
5) Ecofin Council decision that a State has failed to take
effective corrective action within the required time frame, together with further recommendations for corrective action
(EDR Article 4).
152. See Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact,
supra note 7, Member States pt. 7. For an analysis of how the Commission should react
to Member State contentions that a reduction in GDP of less than 2% justifies an excessive deficit, see AntonioJ. Cabral, Main Aspects of the Working of the SGP, in THE STABILITY
AND GRowTH PAcT, supra note 5, at 139, 143-45.

153. See Heipertz & Verdun, supra note 5, at 989.
154. Segers & Van Esch, supra note 48, at 1105.
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6) After lapse of a month, an Ecofin Council decision warning that a delinquent State's further failure to take appropriate
corrective action will lead to sanctions (EDR Article 5).
7) Ecofin Council decision to impose sanctions (EDR Article 6).
We should immediately note that by virtue of EC Treaty Article 122(5), only the States within the Eurozone, i.e., the
Eurogroup Finance Ministers, have the right to vote in taking
the decisions to warn of sanctions or impose sanctions.
Now for a more detailed review of the EDR. In the first
phase, in Article 3, the Commission is to evaluate the budgetary
position of a Member State and give its opinion on whether an
excessive deficit exists. This Commission decision naturally flows
from its evaluation of a State's Stability Program pursuant to Article 5 of the MSR, described previously. The Council then reviews the Commission opinion and decides, in its discretion (but
presumably intended to be influenced by the Council's commitments set out in the European Council Resolution on the SGP),
whether an excessive deficit exists. Pursuant to EC Treaty Article
104(6), the Council vote to this effect must be taken by the
Council's customary qualified majority vote, without any bar on
including the affected Member State's vote. Article 3 of the EDR
further provides that the Council must then recommend corrective action to the Member State concerned, with a deadline of
four months for the start of the corrective action. The excessive
deficit should be corrected "in the year following its identification unless there are special circumstances."1 5 Although a State
that is deemed to have an excessive deficit may be unhappy with
this decision, the adverse consequence, namely the need to commence various forms of corrective action, is not very onerous.
Up to this point, the EDR procedure is distinctly soft law, and
the procedure is generally applied in practice without any great
controversy.
In the second phase, Article 4 of the EDR follows the procedure laid out in EC Treaty Article 104(8). Under Article 4, the
Council has the power to decide that the State has taken "no
effective action" to correct its deficit and demand corrective action in further recommendations. Further, in a manifest effort
to put pressure on the delinquent State, the Council may take a
155. Council Regulation No. 1467/97, supra note 12, art. 3(4).
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decision to make its recommendations public. Treaty Article
104(13) requires that in taking the decision to make its recommendation public, the Council may only act by a special twothirds weighted vote majority, excluding the vote of the delinquent Member State. Presumably the obligation on the Ecofin
Council to decide specifically on making public its recommendations before doing so reflects a concern that publication could
be embarrassing to a State government. (As a practical matter,
however, it would seem more sensible to have opted for transparency at this stage, requiring an automatic disclosure of the
Council action, precisely because this would put pressure on the
delinquent State to take corrective measures, thus avoiding the
necessity to move on in the procedure.)' 5 6 When the Council
decides that a State has not taken sufficient or effective action,
this obviously substantially increases the peer pressure on the
State concerned to act more vigorously. Predictably, this phase
of the EDR procedure is apt to become much more contentious,
as the State criticized is apt to argue either that its deficit is exceptional and justifiable, or that its proposed corrective measures will be fully effective, or both, while the Commission and
some other States' Finance Ministers may strongly disagree.
Under EDR Article 5, if the Council continues to consider
that the delinquent State is not taking "effective action" to correct the deficit, the Council can decide to give a final warning
"notice" of sanctions. EC Treaty Article 104(9) states that the
Council may make recommendations 'judged necessary by the
Council to remedy the situation," which suggests that the recommendations are intended to be effectively binding on the Member State concerned, which may face sanctions for failure to follow them. Treaty Article 104(13) again dictates that the Council
vote in acting under Article 104(9), and hence under EDR Article 5, must be taken by a special two-thirds weighted vote majority, excluding the vote of the delinquent State. Moreover, by
cross-reference to EC Treaty Article 122(5), only States in the
Eurozone can vote on the decision to give a final warning. At
this point the EDR procedure, and its application of Article
104(9), shifts from soft law, in which peer pressure constitutes
the principal motive for a State concerned to take corrective ac-

156. See SMITS, supra note 3, at 82.
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tion, to the start of the hard law phase, because the final warning
notice is a prerequisite for the imposition of sanctions.
The third and final procedural stage covers the imposition
of sanctions. EDR Article 6 prescribes that the Council "shall
impose sanctions" if a Member State fails to comply with the
Council's decision that it should take measures for the deficit
reduction. Note that the use of the word "shall" in EDR Article 6
appears to place the Council under a duty to impose sanctions,
while EC Treaty Article 104(11), upon which Article 6 is based,
only states that "the Council may decide to apply" sanctions.
Under Article 6, the Council is supposed to act to impose the
non-interest bearing deposit sanction within two months following its prior decision providing its recommendations and giving
notice of the risk of sanctions. As before, EC Treaty Article
104(13) stipulates that the Council must act by a special twothirds majority weighted vote, without counting the vote of the
delinquent State. As a procedural alternative to Article 6, EDR
Article 9 permits the Council to hold the excessive deficit procedure "in abeyance" if it considers that the delinquent State is
taking action to comply with Council recommendations.
EDR Articles 11 and 12 stipulate that the usual sanction
which the Ecofin Council may impose on a Member State that
fails to correct its excessive deficit is a non-interest bearing deposit equal to 0.2% of the State's GDP. If the State initially sanctioned fails to take appropriate corrective measures to reduce or
eliminate its excessive deficit in the next year, EDR Article 12(2)
permits the sanction to be increased. The initial 0.2% of GDP
deposit can be increased in a variable calculation up to a maximum of 0.5% of GDP, in function of the degree to which the
State's most recent annual deficit exceeds 3% of GDP.15 7 The
text thus fleshes out EC Treaty Article 104(11), which refers only
to "a non-interest bearing deposit of an appropriate size." As
before, EC Treaty Article 104(13) requires the Council to act to
impose this sanction by an exceptional two-thirds weighted vote,
without permitting the delinquent State to vote.
Under EDR Article 13, failure of a State to correct its deficit
157. See Council Regulation No. 1467/97, supra note 12, art. 12. The mode of
calculation of any increase in sanctions is quite complicated. For an illustration indicating how they might be calculated in a hypothetical case, see Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger &
Jakob de Haan, EUROPEAN MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY 90 (2000). A Commission civil
servant provides a descriptive analysis in A. Cabral, supra note 152, at 148-51.
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status within two years after the Council decision imposing the
initial sanction could lead to a Council decision to convert the
deposit into a fine. After some debate on the issue in spring
1997, the ultimate text of Article 16 prescribes that both the interest on any deposit and any ultimate fine are not treated as
Community revenues, as the Commission had initially proposed,
but rather are distributed among all the participating States
15 8
within the Eurozone that do not have an excessive deficit.
Under EDR Article 16, the allocation is made in proportion to
each State's share in the global GDP of all the eligible States.
Incidentally, it is worth noting that the Treaty of Maastricht's amendment of EC Treaty Article 228 for the first time
authorized the Court of Justice to impose financial penalties on
a Member State that fails to abide by a judgment in an Article
226 infringement proceeding. Member State acceptance of the
principle that financial penalties are appropriate under Article
228 may well have facilitated acceptance of the idea that financial penalties might be imposed under Article 104.
The authors of the EDR undoubtedly intended to make the
sanctions of a non-interest bearing deposit and a possible later
fine to be so large as to make it highly unlikely that a State would
not take the necessary action to correct an excessive deficit. Indeed, some commentators believe that the EDR's penalties may
never have been intended to be applied in practice, but only to
serve as a deterrent. Professor Imelda Maher colorfully termed
the sanctions a "nuclear option... little more than symbolic."15 9

Early commentators differed on whether the EDR's sanction
provisions were intended to be essentially automatic, or subject
to political considerations, as well as on the likelihood of their
use in practice. Professor Hahn, writing in 1998, emphasized
the impact of the commitments made by the Council and Member States in the European Council Resolution on the SGP and
158. See Council Regulation No. 1467/97, supra note 12, art. 16. The Proposal for
a Council Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, supra note 59, art. 12, would have included any interest on deposits or fines in general Community resources.
159. Imelda Maher, Economic Policy Coordination and the European Court: Excessive
Deficits and Ecofin Discretion, 29 EUR. L. Rxv. 831, 833 (2004) (citing a House of Lords
study). Also rather skeptical is the appraisal of the sanction approach by political scientist Thomas Willett, who concludes that it is "probable that the Stability Pact will be
viewed as a symbolic victory for the Germans but one [with] few teeth and.., relatively
little effect on the fiscal behavior of EMU governments." Willett, supra note 49, at 60.
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concluded that "the imposition of sanctions definitely enters the
realm of probability, and indeed certainty."' 60 Professors Wessels and Linsemann contended that the Ecofin Council and
Member States would comply with the rules "rigorously, that is,
the rules on the timing and the criteria will be interpreted liter16 1
ally . . . even when the Council imposes considerable fines."
In contrast, Professors Amtenbrink and de Haan emphasized
that Council action under the EDR represents "essentially
a po1 62
litical decision rather than an inevitable automatism."
A final important note should be made. By virtue of their
Protocols opting out of the final stage of Monetary Union,
neither Denmark nor the United Kingdom are subject to the
risk of sanctions under the EDR. Furthermore, by virtue of EC

Treaty Article 122(3), those States that have not yet satisfied the
convergence criteria for entry into the final stage of Monetary
Union are also not subject to the risk of sanctions under Treaty
Articles 104(9) and (11) and hence under the EDR. Therefore,
Sweden and nine of the twelve new Member States are presently
excluded from the risk of sanctions. As noted above, the MSR
does apply to all EU States. Likewise the EDR's substantive standards for determining whether a State has an excessive deficit, as
well as the procedural review in phase one culminating in Council recommendations for corrective measures to end an excessive
deficit, do apply to all States in the EU. Thus, after the ten new
Member States joined the EU on May 1, 2004, the Commission
and the Ecofin Council included them in the regular review of
their annual budgetary conditions. After Bulgaria and Romania
joined the EU on January 1, 2007 they were likewise included in
the review.
Not only are the States that are not presently in the
Eurozone free of risk of sanctions, but they are also excluded
from voting to impose sanctions. Pursuant to EC Treaty Article
122(5), only the States currently in the Eurozone cast weighted
160. Hahn, supra note 5, at 96. Writing contemporaneously, economist Niels
Thygesen considered that the presence of sanctions would deter States from excessive
deficits, but worried that sanctions might not be applied when required. See Thygesen,
supra note 53, at 28. Economists Ray Barrell and Karen Dury considered it unlikely that
States would in fact breach the SGP excessive deficit rules. See Ray Barrell & Karen
Dury, Will the SGP Ever Be Breached?, inTHE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACr, supra note 5, at
235.
161. Wessels & Linsemann, supra note 115, at 68.
162. Amtenbrink & de Haan, supra note 137, at 1086.
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votes in the procedural decisions taken by the Council to give
notice of the prospect of sanctions under EC Treaty Article
104(9) and EDR Article 6, or the actual imposition of sanctions
under EC Treaty Article 104(11) and EDR Articles 7 and 11-13.
We will see this voting rule in practice when we examine the
Ecofin Council's votes at its meeting on November 25, 2003 in
the next Part.
III. THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT IN OPERATION:
1999-2003
Because all the States within the EU enjoyed moderate economic growth during 1999 and 2000,163 with either a budget surplus or only a low deficit, no issues arose concerning the application of the SGP during that period. In January 2001, however,
the Commission recommended to the Ecofin Council that Ireland be publicly criticized for an excessively expansionary 2001
budget, 164 in view of Ireland's inflation rate of 5.6% in 2000 and
a continued strong growth rate forecast for 2001. When on February 12, 2001 the Ecofin Council followed the recommendation t 6 5 and publicly urged Ireland to modify its budget, the Irish
media reacted with indignation. Subsequently, on November 6,
2001, the Council concluded, on the basis of a Commission report, that Ireland was largely following its recommendations, but
continued to warn the Irish government to exercise vigilance to
keep the Irish economy from overheating.1 6 6 Certainly the
steady strong economic growth of the Irish economy, which frequently causes Ireland's economic cycle to diverge from that prevailing on the continent, represents a serious operational prob163. For a review of the healthy economic situation in the EU, see

EUROPEAN COM-

MISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

(1999) (average GDP growth rate of 2.1%); see also

1999, at

31

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL

2000, 1 35-42 (2000) (average
GDP growth rate of 3.4%). For a typical media report, see Tony Barber, Cheers in Eurozone as Economic Growth Hits Home: Lower Unemployment and Higher Consumer ConfidenceEurope Is Finally Getting More Attention, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), June 7, 2000, at 2.
164. See E.U. BULL., no. 1/2, pt. 1.3.7 (2001).
165. See id. at 1.3.8; see also DINAN, supra note 3, at 512 (terms criticism of Ireland
"bizarre" in view of Ireland's budget surplus of 4.6% at time); Pisani-Ferry, supra note
22, at 837 (also considered Council recommendation to be "misguided" and Irish government's policy to be correct).
166. See E.U. BULL., no. 11, pt. 1.3.3 (2001).
REPORT ON THE AcTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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lem for the Irish government in preparing and executing its
budgetary policies.
After Ireland, Portugal became the next Eurozone State to
receive criticism under the Stability Pact procedures. Concerned by an estimated deficit of 2.2% of GDP in 2001, which
would cause the accumulated government debt to rise to 56% of
GDP, the Commission recommended that Portugal receive an
"early warning" to rein in public spending. 167 Because the Portuguese government committed itself to reduce the deficit in 2002,
the Ecofin Council on February 12, 2002 merely took note of the
situation and Portugal's commitments. 6
After an election in April 2002 brought Prime Minister Barroso's Social Democratic party to power, the new Portuguese
government revised upward the 2001 deficit statistic to 4.1% of
GDP (blaming, quite naturally, the prior government's allegedly
excessive spending policy). The new government pledged efforts to reduce spending and keep the deficit below 3% in 2002.
On November 5, 2002, the Ecofin Council concluded in Decision 2002/923 that Portugal had an excessive deficit and issued a
serious warning that this needed to be remedied rapidly. 161 The
Council set a deadline of December 31, 2002 for Portugal to take
the necessary measures. By the end of 2002, Portugal had made
serious efforts to comply, reducing the deficit to around 2.8% of
GDP through substantial cuts in government spending. In
March 2003, the Ecofin Council recognized Portugal's continued progress toward a likely deficit of 2.4% in 2003, and concluded that Portugal broadly complied with the Stability Pact's
requirements.1 7 0
Serious strain in the Stability Pact framework began in 2002.
As the economy throughout most of the Eurozone deteriorated
167. See E.U. BULL., no. 1/2, at 24-26, pts. 1.3.15-1.3.16 (2002); see also Paul Meller,
Germany and PortugalFace Warnings to Rein in Deficits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2002, at WI.
168. See E.U. BULL., supra note 16, at 25-26, pt. 1.3.16; see Amtenbrink & de Haan,
supra note 137, at 1085; see also supra note 140 and accompanying text (Council is not
obliged to provide "early warning" to State when Commission recommends one).
169. See Council Decision No. 2002/923/EC, O.J. L 322/30 (2002) (on existence
of excessive deficit in Portugal); see also E.U. BULL., no. 11, at 13, pt. 1.3.7 (2002).
170. See E.U. BULL., no. 3, at 45-46, pt. 1.3.14 (2003). Because Portugal brought its
deficit down to 2.7% in 2002 and 2.8% in 2003, on May 11, 2004, the Council abrogated
its decision that Portugal had an excessive deficit. See E.U. BULL., no. 5, at 12, pt. 1.3.9
(2004); see also L.AsrA, supra note 3, at 267 (describes successive Council actions concerning Portugal).
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in 2002 (rather in parallel to the situation in the United States),
with average annual GDP growth falling to an anemic 0.8%,
while average unemployment rose from 8% to 9%,171 the strict
demands for low deficits imposed by the Stability Pact came
under increasing challenge by national governments and the
media. On February 12, 2002, the Ecofin Council reviewed Germany's economic situation, based upon its estimated 2001 deficit
of 2.6% of GDP and forecasts for an increased deficit in 2002.
Although the Commission had recommended an "early warning," the Council took no action, 172 accepting the Schroeder
government's promise to rein in its budgetary expenses, especially social benefits.
However, by fall 2002, the economic situation in Germany,
France, Italy and the Netherlands had deteriorated further, approaching a recession. Unemployment rose sharply, especially
in Germany, where it passed 10%.1 7 3 In achieving a narrow victory in the September 2002 elections, Chancellor Schroeder's
Socialist-Green government pledged further efforts to stimulate economic growth by lowering tax rates and augmenting various spending programs. Similarly, the Conservative governments of President Chirac and Prime Minister Raffarin in France
and Prime Minister Berlusconi in Italy pressed to stimulate their
economies through new spending programs and tax reductions
without manifesting any great concern about the annual deficit
levels.
Predictably, this provoked sharp criticism of these political
leaders by Monetary Affairs Commissioner Solbes and critical
Commission evaluations of the budgetary conditions in both
States. 174 Surprisingly, however, Commission President Prodi
(who, as Prime Minister, had led Italy's successful efforts to meet
the convergence criteria in 1997) publicly assessed the Stability
Pact on October 18, 2002 as "stupid, like all decisions that are
171. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 2002,
57 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 GENERAL REPORT ON THE EU].

172. See E.U. BULL., supra note 16, at 17-18, pt. 1.3.5. The Council apparently decided unanimously not to issue the warning, based on German promises to monitor
social benefit spending and the overall budget. See Paul Meller, EuropeansDecide Against
Warning Germany on Budget Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2002, at A5.
173. See Steven Erlanger, German Unemployment Is GrowingProblemfor Schr6der, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at A3.
63.
174. See 2002 GENERAL REPORT ON THE EU, supra note 171,
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rigid" and called for "a more intelligent tool." '7 5
The controversy over the merits of the Stability Pact and
over the execution of its procedures and guidelines increased
throughout 2003. The economic situation throughout the EU,
and particularly in the Euro-area, worsened in 2003 "with
'
mounting unemployment and deteriorating public finances." 176
Euro-area unemployment averaged 8.9%, while average deficits
were around 2.7% of GDP. 1 77 In 2002, Germany significantly exceeded the maximum 3% annual GDP deficit level, with a 3.5%
deficit.17 8 France's deficit neared 3% in 2002.17' As both nations fell clearly into recession in the first half of 2003, their governments understandably sought new ways of stimulating economic growth with little concern for the strictures of the Stability
Pact.
Nonetheless, the Commission pressed for corrective action
by both States, issuing critical evaluatory reports. Accordingly,
on January 21, 2003, the Ecofin Council reviewed Germany's status, concluded that Germany's 2003 deficit was likely again to
exceed the 3% level, in part because Germany's GDP growth
rate was unlikely even to hit 1.5% of GDP, and urged structural
reforms, "notably of the labor market."1 8 Concluding the procedures set in the first phase of the EDR, the Council adopted a
decision under EC Treaty Article 104(6) that Germany had an
excessive deficit of 3.8% in 2002, and then issued recommendations pursuant to Article 104(7) for budgetary revisions to reduce the 2003 deficit to 2.75% before May 21, 2003181 (the four
month period within which a State should take corrective action,
foreseen in the EDR's Article 3(4)). As indicated in the prior
section, Treaty Article 104(6) and the EDR permitted the Ecofin
175. Elaine Sciolino, An Italian Official's Blunt Words Set Off Euro-Mayhem, N.Y.
Oct. 19, 2002, at A8. Paul De Grauwe quotes President Prodi with approval,
observing that the "idea that countries should comply with a numerical constraint of
3% irrespective of their debt levels and underlying economic conditions is 'stupid.'" DE
GRAUWE, supra note 3, at 239.
TIMES,

176.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN

2003, 100 (2003).
177. See id.

UNION

178. See E.U. BULL., no. 1/2, at 24-25, pt. 1.3.15 (2003).

179. See id. at 29-30, pt. 1.3.19. Final Eurostat statistics indicated that France's deficit in 2002 hit 3.2%, marginally exceeding 3%.
180. Id. at 24-25, pt. 1.3.15.
181. See Council Decision No. 2003/89/EC, OJ. L 34/16 (2003) (on existence of
excessive deficit in Germany); see also LASTRA, supra note 3, at 268.
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Council to take the decision that Germany had an excessive deficit by an ordinary qualified majority vote, which would include
the vote of Germany. That the Ecofin Council could achieve this
majority suggests that in early 2003 the Ecofin Council believed
that Germany had a realistic opportunity to reduce its projected
2003 deficit significantly.
With regard to France, the Ecofin Council review of January
21, 2003 concluded that France's estimate of a 2.6% deficit for
2003 was optimistic and that France might breach the 3% deficit
level, and urged in consequence that France should curb health
and social security expenditures.1 82 The Council accordingly issued an "early warning" to France. 8 3 On June 3, 2003, when the
Council next reviewed France's status, the Council accepted the
Commission's view that France could now be said to have an excessive deficit, took a decision to that effect under Article
104(6), and set October 3 as the deadline for corrective measures pursuant to Article 104(7) 184 (again, a four month period
for corrective action).
After the French economy experienced a 0.3% decline in
GDP during the second quarter of 2003, on August 28, 2003,
Prime Minister Raffarin asserted that his government's primary
responsibility was to "mobilize all of the strengths of our country
for growth and employment," and urged that the SGP be made
more flexible.1 8 5 The French budget presented by the government on September 25, 2003 indicated a 2004 deficit estimate
of 3.6%, in part because President Chirac and Prime Minister
Raffarin were determined to cut the income tax rate again, in
order to increase consumer spending.18 6 In Germany, in the
182. See E.U. BULL., supra note 17, at 29-30, pt. 1.3.19.
183. See id. at 30, pt. 1.3.20. By March 2003, the French government predicted a
3.4% deficit for 2003 because of its economic slowdown. See Francesco Guerrera, France
Sweeps Aside Eurozone Rules, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Mar. 7, 2003, at 7.
184. See Council Decision No. 2003/487/EC, O.J. L 165/29 (2003) (on existence
of excessive deficit in France); see also E.U. BULL., no. 6, at 31, pt. 1.3.5 (2003).
185. See Thomas Fuller, France Defends Its Flouting of Europe's Rules on Deficits, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at W1; see also Robert Graham & Tony Major, Gloomy FrenchData
Add to Eurozone Woes, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Aug. 21, 2003, at 1; Robert Graham, French
Growth Forecast of 0.5% for 2003 Unlikely to be Reached, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Oct. 2, 2003, at
4.
186. Robert Graham, Jo Johnson & George Parker, French PM Defends Breach of EU
Pact, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Sept. 26, 2003, at 9; see also Nicholas George, Jo Johnson,
George Parker & Hugh Williamson, French Tax Cut Sets Stage for Showdown, FIN. TIMES
(U.K.), Sept. 5, 2003, at 8.
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summer of 2003, Chancellor Schroeder continued to press forward with substantial tax cuts to energize the German economy,
now forecasting the 2003 deficit to be substantially in excess of
3%, probably 3.8%. In a public statement, Chancellor Schroeder predicted that Member States would increasingly see it necessary to "interpret [the stability pact] in an economically sensible way." 18 7 France and Germany now sought a more flexible
application of the Pact, to prevent the imposition of the Excessive Deficit Procedure penalties when governments undertake
measures to combat unemployment and foster growth during
periods of serious economic downturns. 18 At this point not only
had Germany suffered a shallow recession in mid-2003, but also
the Italian economy went into recession, with the risk that the
Italian deficit in 2003 would exceed 3% of GDP."'9 From then
on, the Italian government indicated sympathy for the FrancoGerman position.
Naturally, Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner
Solbes and the European Central Bank were opposed to any revision in the SGP. The Commission managed to achieve a united
front in efforts to keep the Pact in force. In unusual public statements, Commissioners Monti and Lamy supported this view,' 9 °
and President Prodi supported the Pact in a meeting with Prime
Minister Raffarin on August 27.191 Moreover, during this period
in the summer and fall of 2003, a number of finance ministers
from smaller nations, such as Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland
and the Netherlands, criticized the Franco-German position and
urged that the Ecofin Council proceed to apply the EDR's provisions. 19 2 Nonetheless there was widespread skepticism that sanctions were either economically or politically possible against
187. See Hugh Williamson, More States Ready to Challenge Stability Pact, FIN. TIMES
(U.K.), Aug. 29, 2003, at 6; see also Robert Graham, Tony Major, George Parker, Hugh
Williamson & Peter Wise, German Tax Cut Plans Put Pressureon Pact, FIN. TIMES (U.K.),
July 1, 2003, at 10.
188. See Thomas Fuller, Chirac Urges Easing ofEU Budget Rules, Ir'L.HERALD TRm.,

July 15, 2003, at 1; see also Bertrand Benoit, Schroder Seeks Backing of Blair for Europe
Growth Plan, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Sept. 19, 2003, at 8.

189. See Eric Pfanner, Data Show Recessions in Germany and Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
2003, at W1.
190. See Paul Meller, Euro Deficit Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2003, at C2.
191. See Fuller, supra note 188.
192. See Daniel Dombey & George Parker, Eurogroup Torn Apart as French Deficit
Rouses Anger, FIN. TIMES (U.K.),July 16, 2003, at 6; see alsoJudy Dempsey, Belgian Premier
Stands Firmly in Favour of Europe's Stability Pact, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Sept. 26, 2003, at 9;
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France or Germany.'9 3
An Ecofin Council meeting on September 12, 2003 urged
France to revise its budget policy to reduce the estimated deficit
before its next session in October. 194 Nonetheless, France's September 25, 2003 estimated budget for 2004 showed a deficit of
3.6% of GDP.19 In mid-October, the Commission reluctantly
concluded that it would not recommend that the Ecofin Council
begin the next phase in the EDR procedure to impose penalties
on France, provided that France would promise to reduce its
2004 deficit by 0.3% of GDP.' 9 6 On October 22, however, the
French Ministry of Finance rejected this suggestion, contending
that such a cut would be "destabilizing" to the French economy.19 7 Meanwhile Germany's Finance Minister Eichel announced revised budget deficit estimates on October 24, indicating that Germany's continued anemic economic growth would
cause the deficit to stay above the 3% of GDP ceiling in 2004,
marking the third successive annual breach of the rule. 9 ' He
reduced the forecast for growth in GDP in 2004 from 2% to
1.7%.
A Financial Times editorial on October 27 declared that
"[t]he pursuit of deficit rules of the kind currently operational
in Europe is . . . inconsistent with the conduct of sensible economic policies."' 9 9 The editorial contended that to oblige
France and Germany (as well as the United Kingdom, which also
seemed likely to breach the 3% of GDP deficit ceiling in 2003)
to reduce public expenditures or increase taxes currently would
be inadvisable, because "the risk of such collective action would
Nicholas George, Jo Johnson, George Parker & Hugh Williamson, French Tax Cut Sets
Stage for Showdown, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Sept. 5, 2003, at 8.
193. See George Parker, EU Haunted by Spectre of Pact No One Will Let Die, FIN. TIMES
(U.K.), July 3, 2003, at 8; see also Daniel Dombey, George Parker & Hugh Williamson,
Commission Powerless as ParisDefies Euro Rules, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Oct. 4, 2003, at 9.
194. See E.U. BULL., no. 10, at 31, pt. 1.3.11 (2003).
195. See Graham, Johnson & Parker, supra note 186.
196. See Jo Johnson & George Parker, France Given More Time to Pull Back Budget
Deficit, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Oct. 21, 2003, at 9.
197. See Jo Johnson & George Parker, FranceDefiant on EU Compromise Planfor Deficit, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Oct. 22, 2003, at 12.
198. See Bertrand Benoit & Tobias Buck, Berlin to Breach Deficit Rules in 2004, FIN.
TIMES (U.K.), Oct. 24, 2003, at 8.
199. Editorial, Living with the Rules: Public Deficits Are Ballooning in Europe's Big
Countries, FIN. TIMEs (U.K.), Oct. 27, 2003, at 20.
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be a Europe-wide recession. 2 ° °
This background set the stage for a crucial meeting of the
Ecofin Council on November 25, 2003. The Commission had
recommended on October 21 that the Council should decide
that France had not taken any "effective action" in accordance
with prior Council recommendations to reduce its deficit, pursuant to EC Treaty Article 104(8) and EDR Article 4, and then
recommend to France, pursuant to the notice provision of EC
Treaty Article 104(8), that it reduce its estimated 2004 deficit by
1% and that it end its excessive deficit in 2005.201 With regard to
Germany, the Commission recommended on November 18 that
the Council should decide under Treaty Article 104(8) that Germany had not taken any "effective action" in accordance with
prior Council recommendations to reduce its deficit, and then
recommend under Article 104(9) that Germany reduce its deficit by 0.8% in 2004 and at least 0.5% in 2005.202 Note that in its
recommendations to both States, the Commission asserted that
they would each have an additional year (i.e., until the end of
2005) to bring their deficits below 3%. Nonetheless the Council's endorsement of the Commission recommendations would
have moved further along the procedure toward possible sanctions, because the failure by either France or Germany to follow
the Council recommendations within specified time periods (either at the end of 2004 or 2005) could have then enabled the
Council to move to the next step in the EDR, and actually impose sanctions pursuant to EC Treaty Article 104(11) and EDR
Article 6.
The Ecofin Council meeting on November 25 was certain to
be both difficult and dramatic. Neither France nor Germany
wanted to see the Commission recommendations endorsed by
the Council, not only because they did not want to be the subject
of a further procedural step towards sanctions, but also because
they did not consider the proposed future deficit reduction
levels realistic.2 "3 On the other side, several smaller Member
200. Id.
201. See E.U. BULL., supra note 19, at 31, pts. 1.3.10-.11.
202. See E.U. BULL, no. 11, at 15-16, pt. 1.3.7 (2003); see also Patrick Jenkins &
George Parker, Solbes Tells Berlin to Cut C6bn from Budget, FIN. TIMES (U.K), Nov. 17,
2003, at 7.
203. See George Parker, Berlin and Paris Try to Avoid EU Fines, FIN. TIMES (U.K.),
Nov. 3, 2003, at 6; George Parker, German Proposal Could Be End of Stability Pact, FIN.
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States, notably Austria and the Netherlands, strongly advocated
the firm application of the EDR procedures. 2°4 Naturally, Commission President Prodi and Commissioner Solbes, responsible
for economic affairs, as well as ECB President Trichet, all
pressed for favorable Council action.20 5 Media reports indicated
that the Ecofin meeting revealed a bitter split. Indeed, Germany's Finance Minister Eichel apparently became highly emotional in contesting the Commission proposals, because he felt
that the German government was already demonstrating political courage in adopting unpopular reforms precisely to improve
its long-term fiscal position.20 6
During its rather ill-fated meeting, the Ecofin Council took
votes on the recommendations made by the Commission, but
could not adopt a decision in favor by the special qualified majority required. 20 7 As previously noted, only the Eurozone States
participated in the actual vote on the recommendations under
EC Treaty Article 104(9) for corrective budgetary action by
France and Germany, pursuant to EC Treaty Article 122(5) read
in conjunction with Article 104(13), i.e., a two-third weighted
vote majority of the Eurozone States without counting the vote
of the State that was the subject of the recommendations. Spain
and a few smaller States (Austria, Belgium, Finland and the
Netherlands) were willing to vote in favor of the Commission
recommendations, while France and Italy opposed the recommendation concerning Germany, and Germany and Italy opposed that concerning France. 2 8 The Eurozone Ecofin Council
(U.K.), Nov. 5, 2003, at 8; see a/soJenkins & Parker, supra note 20 (observing that
Germany felt that it could reduce its deficit in 2004 by 0.6% but not 0.8%).
204. See Parker, German ProposalCould Be End of Stability Pact, supra note 203.
205. See George Parker, Ministers Conduct Late-Night Burialfor EU FiscalFramework,
FIN. TIMES (U.K), Nov. 26, 2003, at 8 (noting that both Commission President Prodi
and ECB President Trichet had argued for application of Stability Pact rules at Ecofin
Council dinner).
206. See Bertrand Benoit, Surprise Over Eichel's "Emotional" Response, FIN. TIMES
(U.K), Nov. 26, 2003, at 8. The reporter noted that German Finance Minister Eichel
had been irate in contesting the Commission's recommendations because the German
Socialist government of Chancellor Schroeder was at that time adopting highly unpopular economic reform measures to reduce social costs precisely in order to lower the
deficit. In that regard, see Tony Major & Hugh Williamson, Berlin Economists Cautiously
Optimistic, FIN. TIMES (U.K), Nov. 13, 2003, at 12; Hugh Williamson, Berlin 'Struggling to
Comply with Stability Pact by 2005,' FIN. TIMES (U.K), Dec. 23, 2003, at 6.
207. See E.U. BULL., supra note 20, at 16-18, pt. 1.3.8 (Germany) & 18-19, pt. 1.3.9
(France).
208. See Bertrand Benoit, Joshua Levitt, Tony Major & George Parker, Sanctions
TIMES
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failure to endorse the Commission recommendations is not sur-

prising, because a favorable vote could have led to a subsequent
Council decision to impose sanctions if France and/or Germany
did not comply with them.2 °9

Given this vote impasse, the Ecofin Council presumably
wanted to do something that could be reported as positive news.
Following a compromise proposal presented by Italian Finance
Minister Tremonti, 2 1° the Council decided to adopt what it
termed "conclusions" concerning France and Germany, citing
the "abrupt and unexpected" worsening economic situation in
each State, welcoming each one's "public commitment to implement all the necessary measures to ensure that the deficit will be
below 3% of GDP in 2005 at the latest," accordingly deciding not
to act against either State on the basis of the Commission recommendations.2 1 1 In its conclusions, the Council also agreed "to

hold the excessive deficit procedure for [each State] in abeyance
for the time being, although warning that it might subsequently
take a decision under EC Treaty Article 104(9) if either State
failed to honor its new commitments.

' 212

The Council specifi-

cally recommended that Germany reduce its annual deficit by
0.6% in 2004,213 and that France reduce its deficit by 0.8% in
2004.214

(In both cases, this was not as large a reduction in the

Deal Leaves Euro Pact in Tatters, FIN. TIMES (U.K), Nov. 26, 2003, at 1. Professor JeanVictor Louis has sensibly observed that some States may have declined to vote in favor
of the Commission recommendations "in order to avoid a bigger row at a particularly
difficult moment . . . [during the] Intergovernmental Conference," which was then
considering the draft Constitution. See Jean-Victor Louis, The Economic and Monetary
Union: Law and Institutions, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 575, 579 (2004) [hereinafter

Louis, EMU]. Segers and Van Esch conclude that the outcome demonstrates that the
excessive deficit rules permit a politically-based determination, rather than the automatic application of the strict fiscal standards sought by Germany. Segers & Van Esch,
supra note 48, at 1106.
209. As indicated in the review of the EDR in Part II, EC Treaty, supra note 1, art.
104(b) 11, states that the Council "may decide to apply" sanctions if a State does not
comply with Council recommendations made when giving the final warning.
210. See Parker, supra note 20. According to this account, Tremonti had prepared
his proposals in advance and negotiated with other Ecofin Ministers for their adoption
during a midnight to four o'clock in the morning suspension of the meeting.
211. E.U. BULL., supra note 20, at 16-18, pt. 1.3.8.
212. Id. at 18-19, pt. 1.3.9.
213. Id. at 16-18, pt. 1.3.8. With regard to Germany, the Council conclusion noted
Germany's intent to reduce the annual deficit by 0.6% of GDP in 2004, and by a further
0.5% in 2005.
214. Id. at 18-19, pt. 1.3.9. WAith regard to France, the conclusion noted France's
intent to reduce its deficit by 0.7% of GDP in 2004, and by a further 0.6% in 2005.
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deficit as that urged by the Commission in its recommendations.) Following the Ecofin Council statements, the Commission took an extraordinary step, entering into the record its view
that the Council rejection of its recommendations occurred
"without giving adequate explanation as laid down in the European Council resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact."
The Ecofin Council's actions (or non-actions) promptly
provoked a storm of criticism from the Commission, the ECB,
and government leaders from several smaller States. Pedro
Solbes, the economic affairs Commissioner, declared that the
Ecofin Council conclusions "do not follow the spirit and rules of
the Stability and Growth Pact,"21 while the ECB warned that the
Ecofin action risked "undermining the credibility of the institutional framework and the confidence in sound public finances." 2 16 Gerrit Zalm, the Dutch Finance Minister, declared
that the Stability Pact had been shoved "in the refrigerator," and
the Austrian Finance Minister, Karl-Heinz Grasser, complained
that Austrians would suffer higher interest rates due to the
French and German deficits.2 1 7 Rather ironically, former German Finance Minister Theo Waigel, who had essentially proposed the Stability Pact, now expressed his outrage that Germany should disregard it.2 18 In contrast, Chancellor Schroder
called the results a "reasonable compromise" and referred to
"phases in the economy when one has to stress growth more
than budget consolidation."' 2 19 French Finance Minister Francis
Mer stated that the Stability Pact rules were not working, and
urged a reexamination to improve them "in a democratic fash-

215. Mark Landler & Paul Meller, France and Germany Given More Time to Curb Deficits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2003, at Cl. Commissioner Monti subsequently contended
that France and Germany considered themselves "too powerful to be bound by the
Eurozone's fiscal rules." BirgitJennen & George Parker, Monti Hits at 'Selfish' Paris and
Berlin, FIN. TiMES (U.K.), Dec. 3, 2003, at 8.
216. Press Release, Eur. Cent. Bank, Statement of the Governing Council on the
Ecofin Council Conclusions Regarding the Correction of Excessive Deficits in France
and Germany (Nov. 25, 2003), available at http://www.bportugal.pt/euro/ecbcom/
2003/2511/pact.e.htm. The ECB Governing Council declared that the Ecofin Council conclusions created "serious dangers" and might undermine "the confidence in
sound public finances of Member States across the euro area." Id.
217. Landler & Meller, supra note 215.
218. See id.

219. Id.
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ion" after tempers cooled. 1
The views expressed at the time in the media and by economists and academics were also divided. Indeed, although many
commentators viewed the Stability Pact as dead, some considered that strict enforcement of the EDR would have proved economically counterproductive. Thus, the eminent Belgian economist, Paul DeGrauwe, declared that the Pact was deservedly
dead, because it was "unintelligent" and counter-productive, observing that "during a recession . . . citizens expect the social
insurance mechanisms to function [but the] rigidity of the pact
was blind to this. ' 2 21 FinancialTimes analyst Lionel Barber concurred, contending that "the pact's provisions made no economic sense. Why should a country face penalties when its
budget deficit was going up and its GDP going down?" 2 2 2 Financial markets appeared to take with equanimity the Council failure to take action to pressure France and Germany into stronger
measures to reduce their deficits. 223 More recent commentators
tend to take the view that France and Germany had good economic grounds for resisting the Commission recommendations,
which would have been counterproductive and might have significantly worsened the two States' recessions.2 24

IV. THE COURT JUDGMENT IN COMMISSION V. COUNCIL
(STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT)
A. Summary of the Court Judgment
On January 27, 2004, the Commission sued the Council
before the Court of Justice, 2 5 seeking an annulment of its deci220. See Robert Graham, George Parker & Hugh Williamson, Outrage as Collapse of
Deficit PACT Splits EU, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Nov. 27, 2003, at 1.

221. Paul De Grauwe, The Pact Should Be Replaced and Not Mourned, FIN. TIMES
(U.K.), Nov. 27, 2003, at 19.
222. Lionel Barber, Crocodile Tearsfor the Pact's Timely Death, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Dec.
9, 2003, at 15.
223. See Mark Landler, Politics Rescue Eurofrom Stability Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
29, 2003, at Cl; see also Ed Crooks, EU May Yet Feel the Bite of Paper Tiger, FIN. TIMES
(U.K.), Nov. 26, 2003, at 8.
224. See DE GRAUWE, supra note 3, at 240-41; see also Waltraud Schelkle, Narrowing
the Gap? Law and New Appraches to Governance in the European Union: EU Fiscal Governance: Hard Law in the Shadow of Soft Law?, 13 COL. J. EUR. L. 705, 724-27 (2007) (making
economic appraisal).
225. The Commission apparently was divided on the prudence of suing the Council, but Commissioner Solbes successfully persuaded his colleagues to do so. See Tobias
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sions not to adopt the Commission recommendations concerning France and Germany, and of its substituted conclusions concerning the two States, particularly the conclusion to hold the
excessive deficit procedure "in abeyance." That the Court ofJustice rendered its judgment on July 13, 2004,226 less than six
months after the Commission sued the Council, demonstrates
the importance and the urgency of the proceeding. That Michel
Petite, Director-General of the Commission Legal Service, and
Jean-Claude Piris, Director-General of the Council Legal Service,
presented each institution's case in the oral proceedings underlines the commitment of each institution. 227 The Court's judgment, rendered by an experienced Reporting Judge, Claus
Gulmann, 22 8 largely reached the same conclusions as the opinion of Advocate General Antonio Tizzano, 229 although with
some differences in analysis.
The Financial Times' front page coverage of the judgment
characterized it as "balanced," noting that "both sides claimed
victory," and that it would help to enable a new agreement on a
"more flexible interpretation of the stability pact."230 Focusing
on the Court's conclusion that the Council had discretion
throughout the procedure moving toward sanctions, the German Minister of Finance, Hans Eichel, called the judgment "very
wise. '"231 Commission President Prodi felt that the Court had
Buck & George Parker, Suspension of Euro Stability Pact Was Illegal, Says Solbes, FIN. TIMES
(U.K.), Jan. 8, 2004, at 1.
226. See Commission v. Council, Case C-27/04, [2004] E.C.R. 1-6649 [hereinafter
SGP Judgment]. Professor Imelda Maher provides an excellent appraisal of the judgement in her article, Economic Policy Coordinationand the European Court, supra note 159,
as does Professor Dimitrios Doukas in his article, Dimitrios Doukas, The Frailty of the
Stability and Growth Pact and the European Court ofJustice: Much Ado About Nothing?, 32
LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 293, 297-300 (2005).

227. See George Parker, Brussels and EU States Clash in Court Over Budget Discipline,
FIN. TIMES (U.K), Apr. 29, 2004, at 4.
228. It is perhaps necessary to note that a ReportingJudge writes ajudgment to
reflect the views of the entire Court, not necessarily his personal opinion. Naturally a
Reporting Judge's views usually have a strong influence upon the ultimate language of
the Court's judgment. Former Judge David Edward describes the deliberative process
of the Court in formulating its judgment in David Edward, How the Court ofJustice Works,
20 EUR. L. Rv. 539, 555-57 (1995).
229. See generally Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, Commission v. Council,
Case C-27/04, [2004] E.C.R. 1-214 [hereinafter AG Tizzano Opinion, SGP Judgment].
230. Bertrand Benoit & George Parker, EU Deficit Sanctions Decision 'Illegal', FIN.
TImFs (U.K.),July 14, 2004, at 8.
231. Id.
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confirmed "the central role of the Stability and Growth Pact,"
although he added that it was now necessary to move forward
with compromises with France and Germany.2 3 2 Even the ECB
noted the judgment with "satisfaction,"
calling for the Stability
23 3
Pact rules to be "fully applied.
The most immediate importance of the Court's rather balanced judgment lies not so much in its analysis of the legality of
the Council action, and non-action, at its November 25, 2003
meeting, but rather in the judgment's implications for the virtually inevitable amendment of the EDR, described in Part V infra.
Implications drawn from the Court's judgment may also have a
longer term influence on the respective roles of the Commission
and the Council in the application of the SGP procedures, as we
will consider later.
Fundamentally, the Commission's arguments to the Court
rested on the view that the Ecofin Council's votes, which did not
attain the required majority, upon the Commission's recommendations that the Council decide that neither France nor Germany had taken effective measures to correct their excessive deficits in 2003, and the further recommendations that France and
Germany be told to make specific percentage reductions of their
excessive deficits in 2004 and 2005, constituted in each case a
negative decision with regard to the recommendations, and thus
an act subject to judicial review. The Commission relied heavily
on the strong language in the European Council Resolution on
the Stability and Growth Pact by which the Council was to be
"committed to a rigorous and timely implementation of all elements of the Stability and Growth Pact" and "invited always to
impose sanctions" on a State unwilling to correct an excessive
deficit despite Council recommendations.2 3 4 The Commission
naturally further maintained that the Council "conclusions," especially the one placing the entire sanction procedure "in abeyance," had no legal foundation and indeed were "sui generis measures whose main legal effect is to free the Council and the
232. Id.
233. Id. The ECB's press release also stated that the ECB "remains convinced that
there is no need for changes to the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact." Press
Release, Eur. Cent. Bank, Statement by the European Central Bank (July 13, 2004),
available at http://www.bportugal.pt/euro/ecbcom/2004/13_07/statemente.htm.
234. Council Resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact of 17June 1997, o.J. C
236/1, at 3 (1997); see also supra text accompanying note 71.
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Member States concerned from the binding legal framework" of
Article 104 and the EDR.2 35
For its part, the Council denied that it had any legal duty to
act on the Commission recommendations and further maintained that its votes could not be considered to be judicially reviewable decisions because they did not represent any definitive
acts. Rather, the Council maintained that it had discretion to
act, or not, as it saw fit. Furthermore, the Council regarded its
"conclusions" to represent "texts of a political nature [without]
legal effects," essentially de facto presentations that "record the
situation." 23 6 As such, they would not represent any judicially
reviewable decisions.
It is important to note at once that the Courtjudgment concentrated upon the interpretation and application of Article
104, making references to EDR provisions as essentially only
subordinate supplements to Article 104. The judgment accordingly has a constitutional character, in contrast to one of legislative interpretation.
The Court first dealt with the Ecofin Council's votes upon
the two Commission recommendations with regard to France

and Germany which in each case failed to achieve the requisite
majority vote in favor. In the Court's view, the Council's vote
that did not attain the requisite special qualified majority set by
EC Treaty Article 104(13) did not constitute a "decision" for the
purpose of either Article 104(8) or (9).237 Consequently, the
Council vote in itself did not constitute an act that can be challenged under EC Treaty Article 230 before the Court of Justice.
Moreover, the Court held that neither Treaty Article 104(9) nor
the EDR procedure set a definitive deadline by which the Council must act upon a Commission recommendation to request a
State with an excessive deficit to take any particular corrective
measures. The Council, therefore, could not be considered to
be in legal default, because nothing would prevent the Council
from taking up the issue at a future date and then taking the
requisite vote in favor. Indeed, the Court cdnsidered that to
conclude that the Council could not later resume the procedure
and take action on the Commission recommendations would
235. SGP Judgment, Case C-27/04, [2004) E.C.R 1-6649,
236. Id. 37.
237. Id. 31.

41-43.
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militate against the Council's ability to "ensure expeditious and
effective implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. "238
Although, in contrast, Advocate General Tizzano analyzed the
Council votes as "the adoption of a (negative) position" upon
the Commission recommendations, 23 9 he then further reasoned
that the Council votes did not constitute any reviewable acts because they were not definitive in nature, inasmuch as the excessive deficit issues remained before the Council, which could yet
24 °
adopt the Commission's recommendations.
In this portion of the proceeding, the Council accordingly
won a significant victory. The Court effectively enhanced the
Council's level of discretion at this stage in the excessive deficit
regulatory procedure. The Council does not have to act immediately to evaluate a State's corrective measures as insufficient,
when it previously decided that a State has an excessive deficit,
merely because the Commission recommends a finding that the
affected State's measures are insufficient. The Council can
choose to wait before taking any further decision at this stage in
the EDR procedures. As Professor Maher has observed, the
Court has enabled the Council to act (or, indeed, not to act)
taking into account "the reality of changing economic circumstances in the euro-area," giving it more "flexibility" in applying
the rules. 24 1 However, it is also important to note that the Court
did characterize the "seriousness of an excessive deficit" as one
calling "for urgent action." 242 Moreover, the Court added an
implicit warning to the Council by remarking that the Commission might ultimately have recourse to a suit under EC Treaty
Article 232 against the Council for a failure to act when it has a
238. Id. 33. Professor Doukas finds the Court's reasoning to contain "a striking
contradiction" because the Court relied upon the Council's duty to execute the procedure expeditiously while failing to limit the Council's discretion to delay taking necessary action. Doukas, supra note 22, at 301.
239. AG Tizzano Opinion, SGP Judgment, Case C-27/04, [2004] E.C.R. 1-214,

28.
240. Id.
30-50. The Advocate General observed that during the Court's oral
hearing even the Commission had accepted that the Council could still act on its recommendations. Id.
42, 49.
241. Maher, supra note 159, at 837. Professor Doukas describes the Council as
having "considerable room for manoeuvre, given its prerogative to assess in a different
manner the relevant economic data." Doukas, supra note 22, at 303.
242. SGPJudgment, [2004] E.C.R. 1-6649,
33. Professor Doukas criticizes the
Court for its failure to set any "'useful' or 'reasonable' time limit" to the discretionary
power of the Council to take action. Doukas, supra note 22, at 301.
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243
duty to act under the Treaty.
In the second part of its judgment, the Court assessed the
nature of the Council's "conclusions." The Court rejected the
Council contention that these merely constituted a recognition
of a de facto situation. Rather, the Court held that the Council
"conclusions" effectively put back the deadline for compliance
given to France and Germany in its prior decisions that each had
an excessive deficit, and accordingly produced legal effects. Indeed, the Court considered that the Council had effectively replaced the prior commitments which France and Germany had
made in line with the earlier Commission and Council recommendations with new unilateral commitments made by France
and Germany, thus intending to modify the basis upon which
future action by the two States to reduce their excessive deficits
should be appraised. 24 4 As such, the Council "conclusions" constituted legally effective acts or decisions that the Commission
could challenge under Article 230.
Turning to the issue of the legality of the "conclusions," the
Court initially presented its view of "the broad logic of the excessive deficit procedure" in the light of Article 104.245 The
Court's analytical starting point was its view of the purpose of EC
Treaty Article 104, which was "to encourage and, if necessary,
compel the Member State concerned to reduce [an excessive]
deficit." 246 The Court then emphasized the political force of the
1997 European Council Resolution on the Stability and Growth
Pact, which had committed the Council "to a rigorous and
timely implementation of all elements of the Stability and
Growth Pact. ' 24 7 (Of course, the European Council Resolution
cannot legally bind the Council, because, as we have previously
noted, under EU Treaty Article 4, the European Council may
only provide policy guidelines and not take decisions with legal
force.) Consequently, the Court proclaimed that the budgetary
discipline rules ought to be made fully effective, in view of "the
importance that the framers of the Treaty attach to observance
243. See SGPJudgment, [2004] E.C.R. 1-6649,
25.
244. See id. 48. The Council accepted specific commitments by France and Germany to lower their deficits in 2004 by a percentage less than that recommended by the
Commission. See supra text accompanying notes 213-15.
245. See SGPJudgment, [2004] E.C.R. 1-6649, 77 68-82.
246. Id. 70.
247. Id. 72.
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of budgetary discipline." 24" The Court then emphasized that the
"responsibility for making the Member States observe budgetary
24 9
discipline lies essentially with the Council.1
Examining the procedural stages laid out in the EDR, the
Court declared that in each stage the Commission makes recommendations which constitute the basis for the Council's decision.
However, the Court immediately emphasized that "the Council
has a discretion" and is not bound to follow Commission recommendations for enforcement action, but may even "modify the
measure recommended" in the light of its own "different assessment of the relevant economic data. ' 25 ° Nonetheless, the Council cannot set up its own alternative procedure and "break free
from the rules laid down by Article 104. "1251 In particular, the
Council could not in this case take a decision placing the procedure against France and Germany "in abeyance." In this regard,
the Court again rejected the Council's contention that its "conclusions" represented merely a political statement or a description of the factual situation. Looking at the Council's declaration that it would hold the EDR procedure in abeyance so long
as France and Germany fulfilled their new unilateral commitments, the Court held that the Council had effectively limited its
discretionary power to give a warning notice under Article
104(9), which meant that the Council's conclusions that placed
the procedure in abeyance violated Article 104.252
Furthermore, the Court held that the Council conclusions
that had purported to make new recommendations for corrective action by France and Germany were invalid, because they
constituted modifications of the Council recommendations to
each adopted earlier in 2003 pursuant to Treaty Article 104(7).
The Court limited the extent of the Council's discretion by hold248. Id. 74.
249. Id. 76.
250. Id. 80; see also Doukas, supra note 22, at 307 (discussing the Council's discretionary ability to modify its prior recommendations).
251. SGPJudgment, [2004] E.C.P 1-6649,
81; see also Maher, supra note 159, at
837-38.
252. SGPJudgment, [2004] E.C.R. 1-6649, It 82-89. The Court also noted that the
Council power to place the procedure "in abeyance" under the Treaty existed only
under EDR Article 9(1), clearly not relevant here. See id. at 11 83-85. Advocate General
Tizzano suggested that the Council might have the power to place the procedure in
abeyance due to unexpected circumstances. See AG Tizzano Opinion, SGP Judgment,
Case C-27/04, [2004] E.C.R. 1-214,
132.

1336

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 31:1266

ing that the Council cannot unilaterally modify its prior recommendations "without a fresh recommendation from the Commission since the latter has a right of initiative in the excessive
deficit procedure."25 3 The Court also held that the Eurogroup
Ecofin Ministers, who had purported to accept the new commitments made by France and Germany at the time of the meeting,
did not have the power to modify the prior recommendations
made to France and Germany which had been made by the full
Ecofin Council acting pursuant to Article 104(7).254
B. Reflections Upon the Court ofJustice'sJudgment
We observed previously that because the Court's 2004 judgment was "Solomonic," permitting both the Commission and the
Council to claim a victory on certain issues, its immediate consequence was to increase pressure for the two institutions to settle
their differences through amended regulations. The eminent
Belgian monetary expert Professor Jean-Victor Louis has sensibly
observed that the 'Judgment encouraged those who pleaded for
a change in ... the Council regulations, and not for the adopin order to remedy the shortcomtion of political commitments,
255
ings of the Pact.
The Court's conclusions do however also have important
consequences long-term. Overall, the Court obviously gave comfort both to the Commission and the Council. The Court's rejection of the Commission's view of the near-automatic nature
of the EDR procedure provides the Council with a much
broader level of discretion in view of the sensitive character of
each stage in the EDR procedural progress toward ultimate sanctions. The Council's discretion enables it not only to act to en92.
253. SGPJudgment, [2004] E.C.R. 1-6649,
254. Id. 95. As we have seen in the text at notes 176-79 supra, the earlierJan. 21,
2003 Council recommendations to Germany and June 3, 2003 Council recommendations to France were adopted by the entire Ecofin Council. Pursuant to Article 104(7),
the Eurogroup Finance Ministers may act in lieu of the entire Ecofin Council in taking
decisions pursuant to Article 104(9) and 104(11) concerning sanctions, but not otherwise. Note that Advocate General Tizzano contended that the Council did have the
power to modify its prior recommendations made pursuant to Article 104(7), but could
only do so by action of the full Council, and not just the Eurogroup of Finance Ministers. See AG Tizzano Opinion, SGP Judgment, Case C-27/04, [2004] E.C.R. 1-214,
142-52.
255. Jean-Victor Louis, The Review of the Stability and Growth Pact, 43 COMMON MKT.
L. Ray. 85, 87 (2006).
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dorse Commission recommendations, but also to modify the
Commission recommendations in light of its own assessment of
the economic situation, and even, to take no action for at least a
reasonable period of time (which might even prove to be a relatively long period of time). In the long term, this may prove to
be the most important consequence of the Court's judgment in
terms of the relationship between the Council and the Commission during the various stages of the excessive deficit procedure.
On the other hand, the Court's appraisal of the "logic" of the
SGP certainly has also great consequence for the long term, because it places upon the Council the ultimate responsibility for
rigorous enforcement of the substantive excessive deficit rules.
Indeed, the Court's dicta concerning the possibility of Commission recourse at some point to an Article 232 proceeding against
the Council for an alleged failure to act when the Council has a
duty to act, intimates that the Council may not stall indefinitely
the EDR procedural steps toward the imposition of sanctions.
Moreover, the Court also emphasized the Commission's
power of initiative throughout the process, which the Council
must respect, not being able to "break free from the rules" by
taking some unilateral action. As Professor Maher has observed,
the Court rejected the view that the excessive deficit procedure
represented 'just a political process that can be by-passed" and
augmented the Commission's procedural power to some degree
because "the agenda-setting role of the Commission is enhanced" when the Council cannot act unless and until the Commission provides its recommendations. 256 Professor Jean-Victor
Louis struck a similar note in remarking that the 'judgment
made clear that the Council... could not substitute agreements
between a majority of its members for the acts provided by the
Treaty."

2 57

Which institution can be said to have gained the most from
the judgment? Arguably, it is the Council. The Court held that
the Council had a discretionary role in the excessive deficit procedure when deciding whether a State has incurred an excessive
deficit under Article 104(6), or when making recommendations
for corrective action under Article 104(7), or when deciding
whether to give notice of the risk of sanctions under Article
256. Maher, supra note 159, at 839.
257. Louis, supra note 25, at 87.
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104(9), and in each case could make its own assessment of the
economic factors involved which might differ from that of the
Commission. The Court thus effectively confirmed that the
Council is ultimately the master of the decision-taking process
within the different phases of the excessive deficit procedure.
Professor Doukas has rightly stated that the Court recognized
"the predominant role of the Council" in budgetary surveillance
and "confirmed the wide discretion and the assessment preroga258
tive vested in the Council."
Certainly the Court did grant the power of initiative to the
Commission, with the consequence that the Council cannot take
a decision at any stage in the procedure unless and until the
Commission has made a recommendation for action or a decision. Concentrating upon this aspect of the Court's judgment,
Professor Schelke considers that the Court "found largely in
favor of the Commission. '25 9 However this power of initiative of
the Commission, its "agenda setting ability," does not detract
from the Council's ultimate decisive role in determining
whether or not to take a decision, or to propose any particular
recommendation to a Member State which is the target of an
excessive deficit procedure. The Commission's power of initiative in this procedure is analogous to the Commission's right of
legislative initiative-although it is true that only the Commission can propose an initial draft proposal for legislation under
EC Treaty Articles 251 and 252, what is ultimately decisive is that
only the Council (or the Parliament and the Council acting
jointly in the codecision procedure) can adopt legislation.
That the Council is ultimately the master of the excessive
deficit procedure is constitutionally only appropriate. As we emphasized in Part I.A, the Treaty provisions on economic coordination within the Economic and Monetary Union do not constitute a transfer of sovereignty to the European Community, comparable to the transfer of monetary policy control to the ECB in
Monetary Union. EC Treaty Article 4(1) prescribes the "close
coordination of Member States' economic policies," but does
258. Doukas, supra note 22, at 308. He characterizes the Court's judgment as "a
Pyrrhic victory for the Commission." Id.
259. Schelkle, supra note 22, at 715. In contrast, economist Willem Buiter views
the Commission as winning only a minor procedural victory. See Willem Buiter, The
'Sense and Nonsense of Maastricht' Revisited: What Have We Learnt About Stabilization in
EMU?, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 687, 689 (2006).
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not transfer to the Commission any power to coordinate. It is
the Ecofin Council, representing the Member State governments, which has the final power to determine the degree to
which State economic policies ought to be coordinated. Consequently, once the EDR structurally organized the excessive deficit procedure, it properly remains the Ecofin Council's prerogative to exercise its discretion in adopting decisions or making
recommendations at the various stages. Some commentators
would like to see the Commission exercise independently some
degree of enforcement power in the procedure in order to make
it a more effective limit on State budgetary deficits,2 60 but that is
not constitutionally possible absent either a Treaty amendment
(as the Treaty of Lisbon would do to some degree by its amendment giving the Commission an "early warning" power), or a (reversible) delegation from the Council.
To what degree does the Council have a duty to act to fulfil
its responsibilities under the EDR? The Court's comments on
the Council's duty to act in light of the overall purpose of the
excessive deficit procedure, together with its citation of the European Council Resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact, is
dicta, but important dicta. The Court need not have made these
statements in order to reach its holding. That it did so makes
the Court's emphasis on the high level of the Council's duty to
ensure the effectiveness of the procedure a warning to the Council that it does not have unlimited discretion, and can ultimately
be called to account before the Court if it can be said to violate a
duty to act. The Commission's ability to take action to enforce
this duty of the Council is certainly not guaranteed, because historically the Court has been reluctant to conclude that the
Council has failed to act, in violation of Treaty Article 232, when
the Council has a broad discretion to appraise economic circumstances. 261 In this regard, Professor Doukas has sensibly ob260. The American economist, Barry Eichengreen, has well observed that although in theory the Commission could be given the power to act autonomously in the
excessive deficit procedure in order to improve its enforceability, governments would
never do this, because the Commission is "only loosely accountable to the European
public." Barry Eichengreen, Europe, The Euro and the ECB: Monetary Success, FiscalFailure,
27 J. POL'Y MODELING 427, 434-35 (2005).
261. The leading precedent is still Parliament v. Council, Case 13/83, [1985]
E.C.R. 1513, where the Court declined to find that the Council had failed to act to
adopt a Common Transport Policy, despite the importance of the sector and the Council's long delay in taking any appropriate action.
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served that in view of "the complexity of economic growth factors and the fact that the ECJ cannot substitute its own evaluation for that of the Council, '2 62 a proceeding to attack the
Council for failure to act is unlikely to succeed. At least the
Court has admonished the Council that it cannot refrain from
acting to enforce the rules in circumstances where the facts suggest a manifest abuse of its discretion if it fails to act.
Do the amendments to the regulations reduce the risk of
another Court battle? Objectively speaking, the substantial increase in the number and types of elements that would require
discretionary appraisal by the Council strongly suggests that the
Commission would find it even more difficult to challenge a
Council decision, or failure to act. Moreover, as we shall see in
the next Part, the recitals to the amended SGP regulations expressly cite the need for "close and constructive collaboration"
between the Commission and the Council, which presumably
represents an implied admonition that the two institutions
should preferably conciliate their differences, rather than creating the severe stress to inter-institutional relations necessarily engendered by a Court proceeding.
V. THE REVISED STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
REGULATIONS: LESS EMPHASIS ON STABILITY,
MORE ON GROWTH
A. The Background of the Revised Rules
By late 2004, the political controversy over the proper mode
of application of the SGP rules had cooled considerably. Economic conditions improved in France, Germany and Italy and
indeed in general throughout the EU. By the end of 2004, the
average growth rate in the Eurozone hovered around 2% of
GDP, with France achieving a healthy 2.5% increase in GDP
growth, while both Germany and Italy at least managed a 1%
gain in GDP. 26 Improved economic conditions naturally re262. Doukas, supra note 226, at 303-04; see also Maher, supra note 22, at 699 (observing that "judicial review" is of limited value in this economic governance, because of
"policy learning (and change) over time").
263. See 2004 GENERAL REPORT ON THE EU, supra note 121, pt. 44. Final Eurostat
figures found the average Eurozone growth rate to be 2.1% of GDP, that for the entire
EU to be 2.5%, while France's growth rate was 2.5% of GDP, Germany's 1.1% and
Italy's 1.2%.
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duced political tensions between the Commission and the three
States.
Even before the Court issued its judgment, the mood had
clearly shifted toward a desire to reach a compromise position.
The "Solomonic" character of the judgment provided added motivation, because neither the Commission nor the Council could
claim a decisive victory, and neither wanted further controversy.
Under the skillful leadership of Prime Minister Bertie Ahern,
the Irish Presidency had managed to obtain a consensus in the
European Council in its June 2004 meeting for the adoption of
the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Obviously, as the political leaders of Europe sought to achieve the
ratification of the draft Constitutional Treaty, no one was keen
to continue a fairly fruitless controversy over whether the initial
excessive deficit rules and procedures permitted a flexible, or
only a strict application.
The inauguration in November 2004 of the new Commission headed by President Jose Barosso, the former Prime Minister of Portugal, naturally enabled a re-thinking of Commission
views and policies. The Barosso Commission immediately gave
the promotion of the success of the Lisbon agenda a key place in
its agenda, pressing for the revitalization of efforts to achieve the
agenda in its spring 2005 mid-term review of the program.2 6 4
The Barosso Commission's emphasis on promoting the Lisbon
agenda may well have inclined it to consider more favorably
some revisions to the SGP rules in the direction of greater flexibility and concern for growth. Moreover, after the surprise victory of the Socialists in Spain in March 2004, the new Prime Minister Zapatero named Commissioner Solbes as his Finance Minister. Joaquin Almunia, who succeeded him as Commissioner for
economic and monetary affairs in the spring, and retained the
post in the Barosso Commission, was naturally in a position to reexamine more neutrally the Commission policy concerning the
operational efficacy of the SGP rules.
In June 2004, the European Council specifically requested
the Commission to study the SGP, and in its request emphasized
264. The Commission's priorities for 2005 were set in its work program, Commission Communication, COM (2005) 15 Final (Jan. 2005) (Commission Work Programme for 2005), with an emphasis on renewed vigor toward achieving the Lisbon
strategy. See 2005 GENERAL REPORT ON THE EU, supra note 121, at 47-49.
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that the SGP was based both upon raising growth potential and
securing sound budgetary positions.2 6 5 Accordingly, in one of
the final acts of the Prodi Commission Presidency, the Commission presented a Communication on September 3, 2004,
"Strengthening economic governance and clarifying the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, "266 generally
deemed to represent particularly the views of Commission President Prodi and Commissioner Almunia. 2 67 The Commission's
Communication reflected its reconsideration of the budgetary
review process in the light of its accumulated experience, and
built upon earlier studies that dealt with the SGP, especially one
in November 2002 on "Strengthening the coordination of budgetary policies.

26 8

The Commission's September 2004 Communication began
with the frank observation that its goal was to "respond to the
shortcomings experienced so far [in the SGP] through greater
emphasis to economic developments in recommendations and
an increased focus on safeguarding the sustainability of public
265. Commission Communication, COM (2004) 581 Final (Sept. 2004), at 2, pt. 1
(Strengthening economic governance and clarifying the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact). The European Council request was triggered by its endorsement
of the draft Constitution at its June 2004 session, as a Declaration annexed to the draft
Constitution referred to a desire to have the Commission produce proposals for
"strengthening and clarifying the implementation of the SGP." See Louis, supra note
255, at 86.
266. Commission Communication, supra note 265, COM (2004) 581 Final, summarized in E.U. BULL., no. 9, at 10, pt. 1.3.1 (2004).
267. See Ralph Atkins & George Parker, EU Critics Claim 'Cop-out' as Prodi Eases
Growth Pact, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Sept. 4, 2004, at 9.
268. Commission of the European Communities, Stengthening the Co-ordination
of Budgetary Policies, COM (2002) 668 Final (Nov. 2002) [hereinafter Strengthening
the Co-ordination of Budgetary Policies], cited in E.U. BULL., no. 11, at 13, pt. 1.3.5
(2002). Probably the most significant of the new Commission views in this Communication was that States should continuously strengthen, and not weaken, their budgetary
condition in good economic times. Specifically the Commission proposed that any
State that had a significant annual deficit, even if not exceeding the 3% ceiling, should
improve its budgetary position by reducing its deficit each year by at least 0.5%. The
Commission also indicated that more concern should be given to a State's rate of progress in reducing its aggregate debt down to the 60% of GDP ceiling when the State's
debt exceeds that level. The Commission emphasized that budgetary policies should
contribute to growth and employment, absorbing the Lisbon strategy into economic
coordination. For an overall appraisal of this Communication, see Amtenbrink & de
Haan, supra note 137, at 1096-1100. The Commission's views were largely reiterated in
Commission of the European Union, Public Finances in EMU-2004, COM (2004) 425
Final Gune 2004).
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finances." 269 The Commission also stated the need for a better
linking of "fiscal policy to economic growth and [to the support
of] progress towards realising the Lisbon strategy. "270 Thus at
the outset the Commission was implicitly recognizing that the
MSR and EDR ought to be reexamined in order to introduce a
better appreciation for the growth aspect of the SGP.
Probably the most important Commission proposal for substantive change was to revise the multilateral surveillance process
to concentrate upon "more country-specific circumstances" in
order to improve the "economic rationale. ' 271 The Commission
even accepted that "country-specific circumstances" could include "the impact of structural reforms," and that the EDR's acceptance of excessive deficits in exceptional circumstances
should be modified to accommodate the needs of States encountering periods of prolonged sluggish growth.2 72 The Commission also accepted that longer deadlines for a State's actions to
27 3
correct an excessive deficit might be appropriate.
Altogether the report marked a shift toward Commission
willingness to cooperate with the Council in amending the Multilateral Surveillance and Excessive Deficit Regulations, based
upon its own reconsideration of the budgetary review process
and its accumulated experience. The Commission may well also
have pragmatically realized that the Ecofin Council, and key
Member States, were simply unwilling to apply the strict current
rules. Certainly some of the Communication's proposals reflect
the Commission's acceptance of several of the requests for policy
changes made by France, Germany and Italy, notably an acceptance of the desirability of favorably considering the impact of
structural reforms that promote growth.
Beginning in September 2004, the Ecofin Council, under its
then President Gerrit Zalm, the Finance Minister of the Nether269. Commission Communication, supra note 265, COM (2004) 581 Final, at 2, pt.
1. Louis, supra note 255, at 89-90, provides a useful review of the Communication. Two
experts from the Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs
provide their personal views on it in Marco Buti & Lucio Pench, Why Do Large Countries
Flout the Stability Pact? And What Can Be Done About It?, 42J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 1025
(2004).
270. Commission Communication, supra note 265, COM (2004) 581 Final, at 2, pt.
1.
271. Id. at 4, pt. 2(ii).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 5-6, pt. 2(iii).
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lands, commenced debate on possible amendments to the EDR,
but without any initial accord. 7 4 Not surprisingly, France, Germany and Italy called for radical revisions in the substantive and
procedural rules. 75 Thus, in January 2005, Chancellor Schroeder contributed an unusual Op-Ed article to the Financial Times,
contending that States should be permitted to exceed the 3%
GDP deficit ceiling in order to pursue "a sound policy for growth
and employment," in times of economic stagnation (even when
the stagnation does not constitute a "severe economic downturn"), or when burdened by expensive structural reforms, such
as the labor market and tax reforms comprised within his government's "Agenda 2010" program.2 7 6 Chancellor Schroder also
contended that "intervention by European institutions in the
budgetary sovereignty of national parliaments [should be] permitted only under very limited conditions" and warned against
"imposing mandatory requirements and sanctions too mechanically."12 77 However, Austria, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands were reluctant to weaken the EDP standards,2 78 while ECB
President Trichet was openly critical of any proposals to do so. 279
274. See George Parker, MinistersAgree on Stability Pact Reform-But Not on the Extent,
FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Sept. 11, 2004, at 7; George Parker, Ministers Reject Move to Loosen

BudgetDeficit Rules, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Nov. 17, 2004, at 10. Note that the Dutch Finance
Minister Zalm had been deeply involved in the drafting of the initial MSR and EDR
during the Dutch presidency in early 1997, and was not favorably inclined to any significant revision.
275. See Bertrand Benoit, Paris and Berlin Seek Relaxation of Fiscal Rules, FIN. TIMES
(U.K.), Oct. 27, 2004, at 9; Bertrand Benoit & George Parker, Berlin Seeks Changes in
Stability Pact Budget Rules, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Nov. 8, 2004, at 6.
276. See Gerhard Schroder, A Frameworkfor a Stable Europe, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Jan.
17, 2005, at 17; see also Bertrand Benoit & George Parker, Schroder Urges Loosening of
FiscalRules in EUStates, FIN. TIMES (U.K.),Jan. 17, 2005, at 7. Germany's Finance Minister Hans Eichel also contended that Germany should be permitted to exclude reunification costs in any evaluation of its deficit. See George Parker & Hugh Williamson, Ministers Fear Berlin Demands Will Hit Pact Deal, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Mar. 7, 2005, at 8. Also,
France and Italy proposed that research and development costs be excluded in calculating deficit figures. See George Parker, Europe's National Leaders Strain at Stability Pact
Leash: EU FinanceMinisters Are Some Way from Agreeing the Kind of Reforms that Would Keep
Their Political Masters at Bay, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Jan. 17, 2005, at 7.
277. Schroder, supra note 276.
278. Kerin Hope & George Parker, Small EU States Oppose Moves to Relax Fiscal Pact,
FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 18, 2005, at 10; George Parker, Ralph Atkins & Bertrand Benoit,
Ministers Call to Ease Fiscal Rules, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Jan. 18, 2005, at 6; George Parker,
Plans to Water Down Stability Pact Rules, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Feb 16, 2005, at 8.
279. George Parker, ECB Warns Against Weakening Fiscal Rules, FIN. TIMES (U.K.),
Sept. 23, 2004, at 6; Ralph Atkins, ECB Chief Cautions on Watering Down of EU Stability
Pact, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Mar. 15, 2005, at 8.
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After difficult debates, the Ecofin Council reached a consensus agreement upon a crucial report on March 20, 2005, "Im280
proving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact,
which provided the basis for the drafting of the amendments to
the MSR and EDR. By a fortuitous coincidence, Prime Minister
Juncker of Luxembourg, who also serves as Luxembourg's Finance Minister, was both the current President of the Ecofin
Council and the President of the Eurogroup (as well as President of the European Council). His patient diplomacy was
widely hailed as crucial in achieving the final compromises. 2 8 '
France's Finance Minister Breton proclaimed the revision "a historic agreement," while Austrian Chancellor Schussel took comfort in the compromise as one that "prevented deficits of five 2or
82
six or seven [percent of GDP] being considered tolerable.
Not surprisingly, the ECB indicated its serious concern with the
revisions, fearing they might undermine confidence in public fi283
nances.
When the March 20, 2005 European Council meeting endorsed the Ecofin Council's March 20 Report, the European
Council specifically declared the Report to be a component of
the policy statements and regulations comprising the SGP.28 4
This certainly greatly enhances its importance in indicating the
policy views which underlie the later amended MSR and EDR.
The European Council's conclusions also contained a declaration of policy that undoubtedly influenced the ultimate text of
the amendments to the SGP regulations, reiterating that deficits
should exceed the 3% of GDP ceiling only "exceptionally and
temporarily," but then adding: "The Member States are expected to reduce any deficits during periods of growth, whilst
some flexibility is allowed in times of economic difficulty. Moreover, the pact should help to boost growth and employment by
280. E.U. BULL., no. 3, at Annex II, pt. 1.18 (2005) (Annex II: Improving the
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact).
281. See Bertrand Benoit, Christopher Condon, & George Parker, Juncker Achieves
'Small Miracle' as Deal Is Written, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Mar. 22, 2005, at 6; see also George
Parker, Stability Pact Deal Set for DIY List of Excuses, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Mar. 17, 2005, at 36
(describing Juncker's role in proposing an approach permitting greater flexibility in
the evaluation process).
282. Benoit, Condon, & Parker, supra note 281.
283. Ralph Atkins, ECB Fears Threat to Confidence in Public Finances, FIN. TIMES
(U.K.), Mar. 22, 2005, at 6.
284. E.U. BULL., supra note 280, pt. 1.3.3.
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taking greater account of spending on research, development
and innovation."28 5
The Council's March 2005 Report called for improvement
of the SGP rules, notably to enhance their "economic rationale"
in order to improve their credibility, to better accept the role of
national policy makers, to stress the need to improve budgetary
positions in periods of growth, to take better account of "periods
when economies are growing below trend," and to better appraise the impact of "debt and sustainability. '' 216 The Report reaffirmed the key role of the SGP in securing low inflation, but
of 'job creation, structural
also cited the Lisbon strategy28goals
7
reforms and social cohesion."
Because most of the key conclusions of the Council's March
2005 Report provided the basis for the amended SGP regulations, there is no need to review them here. However, the initial
section of the Report, which deals with improving governance, is
not specifically replicated in the revisions, but merits mentioning as an important policy supplement to the amended regulations. The Report cited the Commission's role in exercising its
right of initiative and responsibility for acting as "guardian of the
Treaty," but then emphasized that the Commission and the
Member States must respect the Council's ultimate "responsibility for the coordination of economic policies." 2 8 The Report
stressed the "commitment" of the States, the Commission and
the Council "to act in close and constructive cooperation in the
[surveillance process, including] full and timely communication
among [them] ."289

Another important feature of the report

was the stress upon "improving peer support and applying peer
pressure," to be achieved within the Eurogroup for States in the
Euro area. 29" The Report also referred to the on-going effort to
statistics system, cruimprove the governance of the European
29 '
statistics.
timely
cial for reliable and
285. Id. pt. 1.1.
286. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1.18. For an excellent appraisal of the Council report, see
Louis, supra note 255, at 90-93, 101-03.
287. E.U. BULL., supra note 280, at Annex II, pt. 1.18.
288. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1.19.
289. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1.20.
290. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1.21. Professor Louis considers this section of the Report
to have great significance, observing that the suggestions were not directly transformed
into the amended rules. See Louis, supra note 255, at 101.
291. During 2005, the Commission and the Council worked upon a new regula-
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B. The Amended MultilateralSurveillance Regulation
Because the purpose of this Article is to consider the shifting balance between stability and growth in the SGP, we will
presently only note some of the important revisions to the regulations that highlight the reduced emphasis on fiscal stability
and the enhanced willingness to endorse efforts to improve economic growth.
The amended MSR's most important structural revision to
the initial MSR is the addition of a new section 1.A MediumTerm Budgetary Objectives.29 2

By virtue of a new Article 2a,

"[e]ach Member State shall have a differentiated medium-term
objective for its budgetary position" which shall be "country-specific." The language reflects the policy shift that both the Commission and the Council had made when calling for more "country-specific" and "differentiated" evaluations in their prior reports. The approach responds to the desire of those Member
States that wanted a better focus on individual national economic situations, but at the same time realizes the operational
value of more than a short term appraisal. Note that it is the
State which initially sets a specific three or four year mediumterm period (e.g., 2005-09) and the desired budget objective at
the end (e.g., a balanced budget, a surplus, or only a low deficit), which the Commission and Council subsequently evaluate.
In a noteworthy policy change, Article 2a permits a State's
medium term objective to diverge from the fundamental policy
goal of a budget "close to balance or in surplus position" in the
initial MSR and the European Council's Stability and Growth
Pact Resolution, but with the caveat that there must be "a safety
margin with respect to the 3% of GDP government deficit ratio."
tion concerning the compilation and review of national budgetary statistics. In December, the Council adopted Regulation 2103/2005 on the quality of statistical data in the
context of the excessive deficit procedure, which substantially revised the system of national compilation of relevant data and enabled more far-reaching review and monitoring, including on-site verification, by the Commission's statistical service. Council Regulation No. 2103/2005, O.J. L 337/1 (2005). The scandal in late 2004 over Greece's
presentation of unreliable and perhaps deliberately inaccurate fiscal data since 2000
undoubtedly promoted the adoption of strict criteria in the Regulation. See Anthee
Carassava, Greece Admits Faking Data to Join Europe, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at Al0;
George Parker, Greek Budget Turns Up Heat on Eurostat,FIN. TIMES (U.K), Sept. 24, 2004,
at 4.
292. Council Regulation No. 1055/2005, O.J. L 174/1 (2005) (amending the Multilateral Surveillance Regulation).
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Again, this reflects the Council's new policy view expressed in its
March Report. This provision would appear to permit a State to
incur low deficits, for a year or even conceivably several years
within its medium-term policy objective, provided that the Commission and the Council accept that there are justifiable economic grounds for this (for example, when a State undertakes
structural reforms of its pension or health programs that require
high short-term costs but anticipate major long-term savings).
Overall, in view of the new policy approach in Article 2a, it is
hard to disagree with Professor Jean-Victor Louis' comment that
"[t]he uniform obligation for all the Member States to adhere to
the medium-term objective of 'close in balance or in surplus' ...
does not exist any more. '"293
Accepting in large measure the requests made by France,
Germany and Italy for greater flexibility in examining each
State's budgetary position, the amended MSR gives greater leeway to the Council in its evaluation of each State's medium-term
budgetary objective and the State's current budgetary "adjustment path" toward the objective-although it should not be forgotten that the Council evaluation must take the Commission's
294
assessment as the initial basis in its own evaluation.
This is spelled out in a new MSR Article 5(1). The text of
Article 5(1) sets out three important shifts in policy. First, the
evaluation of whether a State is appropriately following its "adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objective"
should take an annual improvement in its budgetary position of
29 5
0.5% of GDP as the customary "benchmark" for justifiability.
Second, the Council is admonished to distinguish between "economic good times" when a State should make "a higher adjustment effort," and "economic bad times" when the effort may be
more limited.29 6 (There is no attempt to provide content to the
293. Louis, supra note 253, at 92.
294. As the Court's Judgment made quite clear. See supra notes 242, 258 and accompanying text.
295. The Commission initially recommended this benchmark in its November
2002 Communication. See Strengthening the Co-ordination of Budgetary Policies, supra
note 268, COM (2002) 668 Final. See the discussion of its utility by Amtenbrink & De
Haan, supra note 137, at 1097. On Mar. 7, 2003, the Ecofin Council included this recommended benchmark for budgetary improvement in a report to the European Council. E.U. BULL., no. 3, at 31, pt. 1.3.7 (2003). The March 2005 Council Report then
endorsed the 0.5% benchmark.
296. Whereas 6 in the Preamble to the amended MSR relates to this part of article

2008] ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1349
meaning of good versus bad times.) The Council is authorized
to permit a State to undertake a temporary deviation from its
medium-term objective, provided there exists "an appropriate
safety margin" below the 3% GDP deficit reference level. Third,
the Council is authorized to "take into account the implementation of major structural reforms which have direct long-term
cost-saving effects, including by raising potential growth."2 9 7 A
specific reference is then made to pension reforms that may require a mandatory fully funded plan as an example of such a
major structural reform. This provision not only responds to the
strongly-expressed desire of Chancellor Schroeder's government
to give it credit for "Agenda 2010," its unpopular structural reform of unemployment benefits and taxation, 298 but also implicitly recognizes that some States (notably Greece, Italy and several
Central European States) need to undertake their own structural
reforms, especially to revise and reform their traditional extremely costly state pension policies, 29 9 and ought to be able to
escape the strict rules of the Stability Pact while doing so. Note,
however, that in order to enable the Council to make its evaluation of the justifiability of accepting the impact of major structural reforms, an amendment to Article 3(2)c requires any Member State implementing such structural reforms to provide a "detailed cost-benefit analysis" to the Commission.
Naturally, the new policy approach of Article 5(1), which
applies to the evaluation of the Stability Programs of States
within the Eurozone, is paralleled by a new Article 9(1) that applies to the States adopting Convergence Programs toward eventual membership in the Euro-zone.
Because the revisions to the MSR principally enable the
Commission and the Council to consider more budgetary and
economic data in the surveillance process, strictly a soft law process, the Amended MSR as such has not proved particularly controversial. The Commission itself considers the review of more
5(1), calling for a "more symmetrical approach to fiscal policy" (a phrase taken from
the Council Report) by "enhanced budgetary discipline in economic good times" which
would then help States "to deal with normal cyclical fluctuations."
297. Whereas 8 in the Preamble to the amended MSR supports this policy in article 5(1) by referring to "structural reforms that unequivocally improve the long term
sustainability of public finances."
298. See Schroder, supra note 276.
299. The Council March 2005 Report contained a sub-section 3.4 on considering
the cost of pension reforms. See E.U. BULL., supra note 280, pt. 3.4.
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data to improve the "flexibility and economic rationale" of the
SGP framework. 0 0 Obviously, however, controversy commences
when the evaluation of data in the MSR procedure leads to consequences in the excessive deficit procedure.
C. The Amended Excessive Deficit Regulation

A review of the text of the Amended EDR, as adopted on
June 27, 2005,"' makes it clear that the policy views expressed

both in the Commission's September 3, 2004 Communication
on improving the SGP and the Council's March 2005 Report
have been melded into the revised Regulation. The text certainly reflects a pragmatic rapprochement between the Commission, now led by President Barosso and economic affairs Commissioner Almunia, and the Ministers most active within the
Ecofin Council on this project, led by Prime MinisterJuncker of
Luxembourg. Most of the commentary on the Amended EDR
has been provided by economists and political scientists. 30 2 Professor Jean-Victor Louis has provided the most valuable
legal re3 3
view to date of the Amended EDR and its impact.
Before examining the EDR's substantive provisions, certain
key language in the recitals merit underlining. In the third
"Whereas" recital, the Commission and the Council are committed to "close and constructive cooperation" in the execution of
the procedures. The wording deliberately echoes language in
the governance section of the Council's March 2005 Report,
mentioned previously. It takes on particular significance given
the European Council's endorsement of the Report as an inte300. See Commission of the European Communities, Public Finances in EMU
2006-The First Year of the Revised Stability and Growth Pact, COM (2006) 304 Final,
at 2, pt. I Uune 13, 2006).
301. Council Regulation No. 1056/2005, O.J. L 174/5 (2005) (amending the Excessive Deficit Regulation). Exercising its right of legislative initiative, the Commission
presented a draft text, Commission of the European Communities, Counsel Regulation
on Speeding Up and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure,
COM (2005) 155 Final (Apr. 2005) (amending Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97), which
the Ecofin Council then revised. The Parliament gave favorable advisory opinions. E.U.
BULL., no. 6, pt. 1.3.4 (2005).
302. The Journal of Common Market Studies devoted its November 2006 issue to the
topic, "Economic Governance in EMU Revisited," consisting of nine articles by economists and political scientists. See 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 669-864; see also Eichengreen, supra note 260; Maher, supra note 22; Schelkle, supra note 224.
303. See Louis, supra note 255; see also Doukas, supra note 226; Rend Smits, Some
Reflections on Economic Policy, 34 LEG. ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 5 (2007).
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gral part of the basic policies comprised in the SGP.30 4 The reference represents an admonition that the two institutions should
avoid the sort of divisive political controversy that occurred in
late 2003 and was such an unwelcome distraction during the final negotiations over the text of the draft Constitutional Treaty.
The third "Whereas" clause also marks the role of "peer support and peer pressure" to promote Member State compliance
with Council recommendations. This reference echoes the emphasis on "peer support and peer pressure" not only in the
Council Report, but also to some degree in the Commission
2004 Communication. 5 It clearly represents a policy shift to
more of a soft law approach to compliance, as opposed to a hard
law use of sanctions, or threat of sanctions.
Professor Louis appraises "peer support and peer pressure"
as now being "at the centre of the coordination process," apt to
become the principal mode of enforcing the excessive deficit
rules. 0 a Based upon interviews of a number of senior finance
ministry officials, Professor Schelkle has observed that the
Eurogroup ministers increasingly feel a definite sense of belonging to a club, with the "capacity to reinforce or undermine each
other politically. ' 30 7 In this context, finance ministers who have
successfully dealt with the need to adopt unpopular policies, particularly in achieving Lisbon agenda or other structural reform
programs, may be able to persuade colleagues in other States to
exert a similar degree of political courage in confronting analogous issues. As for peer support, the European Council has recently endorsed the approach of a regular exchange of best
practices and successful policies and programs intended to
achieve the Lisbon agenda or other structural reforms.3 0 8 The
Commission's recent annual report, "Public Finances in EMU 2007," with the sub-title, "Ensuring the effectiveness of the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact," observes that the
revised SGP's preventive arm "focuses mainly on medium-term
304. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
306. Louis, supra note 255, at 101. However, Professor Louis expresses a concern
that finance ministers will not always be capable of exerting peer pressure upon a colleague if they feel that their own States may have to confront similar economic issues in
the future.
307. Schelkle, supra note 224, at 713.
308. E.U. BULL., no. 3, at 7-8, pt. 1.3 (2007).
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planning, peer support and pressure and exchanges of best practices," but notes that these require "a strong political commitment." 3 9 Over time, the reliance upon peer pressure and peer
support rather than the threat of (probably unrealistic) sanctions may prove to be one of the most important operational
improvements in the application of the amended rules, if indeed
such "peer pressure and support" do prove effective in specific
cases.
Undoubtedly the Amended EDR's most crucial substantive
change is to provide far more leeway for a State to claim that a
severe economic downturn justifies its breach of the 3% of GDP
deficit ceiling set in EC Treaty Article 104. The initial EDR standard for a severe economic downturn, which generally required
an annual fall of GDP by 2%, was deleted. (Apart from the ECB
and the Bundesbank, few are apt to mourn the elimination of
this rigid standard.) The new language of Article 2(2) enables
the Commission and the Council to find that a severe economic
downturn occurred whenever there exists "a negative growth
rate" or even a drop in output "during a protracted period of
very low growth relative to potential growth." This new standard
for a severe economic downturn follows the approach set in the
Council's Report. 10 Presumably, if this standard had been in
effect earlier, Germany's deficit of 4% of GDP in 2003 might
have been excused because it suffered a 0.2% downturn in annual GDP, while France's 2003 deficit of 4% might have been
excused because estimates at the time projected an anemic 0.1%
growth in annual GDP. Given the size of the deficits, the Commission would probably still have evaluated both States as having
an excessive deficit, but it is conceivable that the Council might
have exercised its discretion in the application of Treaty Article
104(6) and never formally decided that an excessive deficit existed in either State.
Moreover, not only has the standard been appreciably softened, but the Commission's report evaluating a State's annual
compliance with budgetary discipline must consider a number
of listed factors, many of which might well exculpate a State
309. Commission of the European Communties, Public Finances in EMU-2007,
Ensuring the effectiveness of the preventive arm of the SGP, COM (2007) 316 Final, at
1, pt. 1 (June 13, 2007).
310. E.U. BULL., supra note 280, at Annex 1I, pt. 1.33.

2008] ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1353
from a Commission determination that it should be considered
to have an excessive deficit. Among the most notable are "developments in the medium term economic position," which can include "prevailing cyclical conditions" as well as "policies to foster
research and development and innovation." The reference to
"prevailing cyclical conditions" is not surprising, because both
the Commission in its September 2004 study and the Council's
March 2005 Report pointed toward acceptance of this exculpatory factor, but the specific acceptance of research and development expenses as a possible justification for higher deficits demonstrates that France, Germany and Italy prevailed in the debate
on this issue despite strong opposition from other States. Likewise, "developments in the medium term budgetary position (in
particular, fiscal consolidation efforts in 'good times,' debt sustainability, public investment and the overall quality of public
finances)" are to be taken into consideration. (All were cited in
the Commission Communication.) 3 1 A specific paragraph 5
calls for the Commission and Council "to give due consideration
to the implementation of pension reforms. '1 12 Indeed, the
amended Article 2(3) even requires the Commission to consider
whether a State is subject to the adverse impact of "high level
financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and
to achieving European policy goals." '
This presumably is intended to cover a State's extraordinary expenses in providing
civil or military support for U.N., North Atlantic Treaty Organization or EU foreign policy or security actions, such as in the
South Balkans or Afghanistan. 1 4
Naturally, the Council's assessment of whether it considers
311. Commission Communication, supra note 265, COM (2004) 581 Final, pt. 2(i).
312. It is clear from the serious concern in general for the cost of coping with
"aging populations," in the Commission's terminology, that the specific short-term adverse budgetary impact of pension reforms is bound to be a future factor of considerable importance in the evaluation of virtually all the Member States. As Ren6 Smits has
well observed, "the prospect of a graying population will make it harder for governments to balance their books in the future with increased social security and pension
spending, thus requiring even greater efforts at fiscal prudence now." Smits, supra note
303, at 13.
313. Council Regulation No. 1056/2005, art. 2(3), O.J. L 174/5, at 6 (2005)
(amending the Excessive Deficit Regulation).
314. Professor Louis interprets this rather cryptic phrase as intended to cover primarily "development cooperation and humanitarian aid," as well as some military operations in that context, and observes that some Member States were opposed to any
reference to German unification costs. See Louis, supra note 255, at 98.
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that a State has an excessive deficit must also take account of all
of these factors. Indeed, in view of the Court of Justice's conclusion that the Council has a discretionary power to assess economic circumstances in a different manner than the Commisocial
*3151
that the Ecofin Council might be willing
it is conceivable
sion,
to accept that certain budgetary costs put forward by a State as
incurred to achieve a structural reform are justifiable even
though the Commission evaluation rejects them or gives them
only minor weight.
It should immediately be stressed that the list of factors that
should be appraised by the Commission and the Council in evaluating whether a State has incurred an excessive deficit, or is at
serious risk of doing so, in no way represents an automatic exclusion of the budgetary expenditures related to any specific factor.
As Professor Louis rightly emphasizes, "the relevant factors will
be examined in the preparation of the report ... [n]o expenses
are excluded as such." '16 Either the Commission or the Council

may take purported costs of structural reforms or other factors
in the list into account in the evaluation process, but each institution has discretion in this decision, and may conclude that
they do not justify a deficit.
With regard to the procedural stages set in the initial EDR,
the Amended EDR's principal impact is to extend the time period for each stage in the process. As we previously noted, even
the Commission had accepted that the initial EDR's deadlines
needed to be lengthened to take into account the different economic circumstances of different States. Thus, in the first procedural stage, set out in EDR Article 3(3), a State which is the subject of an initial Council conclusion that an excessive deficit exists will have six months, rather than four months, to start taking
effective corrective action. 1 7 Moreover, the original EDR's Article 3(4) required the affected State to correct the excessive deficit in the fiscal year immediately following the one with the excessive deficit, but the Council now has the discretion to postpone the time-frame for the correction by a further year (i.e.,
allowing two years for the period of correction) whenever "unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavorable conse315. See supra notes 241, 258 and accompanyting text.
316. Louis, supra note 255, at 96-97.
317. For a review of all the lengthened time periods, see id. at 98-99.
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quences for government finances" should occur.3 18
Overall, the revisions move the EDR, and the entire excessive deficit procedure, away from the rigid rules of the initial
EDR in the direction of a greater scope for economic evaluation,
more respect for national idiosyncracies, and greater flexibility
in application, both by the Commission and the Council. Certainly some observers will applaud the softening of hard law aspects and praise the more flexible approach. 31 9 Thus Jean
Pisani-Ferry appraises the revised rules as placing the "emphasis
on economic assessment," and concludes that, based on the initial application of the rules up to May 2006, there is "no empirical basis for the claim that the Pact is dead."3 2 In contrast, other
commentators view the revisions as an abandoning, or at least a
radical weakening of the dike against floods of red ink.32 1 Taking the latter view, the American economist Barry Eichengreen
has remarked, "[i]n principle these reforms are a sensible step
in the direction of greater flexibility. But in practice .. . [they]

all but eliminate the possibility that the pact will be effectively
322
enforced.
It is certainly quite possible that application of the
Amended EDR will reduce the number of occasions in which the
Commission, and subsequently the Council, would evaluate a
State as violating the Treaty prohibition of excessive deficits, and
require corrective budgetary measures to reduce the deficit, particularly because a fairly long list of structural reforms and other
exculpatory economic circumstances may be taken into account
in the budgetary evaluation process. (Critics of this amendment
to the EDR are prone to call it the "DIY" or Do-It-Yourself list,
due to the option that each State has to cite and rely upon one
or another item on the list.) 23 In addition, the lengthened
318. Regulation No. 1056/2005, art. 3(5), O.J. L 174/5, at 7 (2005) (amending the
Excessive Deficit Regulation).
319. Louis, supra note 255, at 104-05, notes the difference of views of initial commentators, and some of their reasoning. He also calls attention to the "optimistic official view of the Commission." For a current thoughtful analysis generally approving the
revisions, see Maher, supra note 22. For an appraisal suggesting that Article 104 sanctions should be eliminated and an exclusively soft law approach used, see Henrik Enderlein, Break It, Don't Fix It, 42 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 1039 (2004).

320.
321.
322.
323.

Pisani-Ferry, supra note 22, at 839.
See the sharply critical view of Buiter, supra note 259.
Eichengreen, supra note 260, at 438.
The DIY characterization originated at the time of the Ecofin Council debates
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timetable for corrective measures should also reduce considerably the risk that any Commission pressure for rapid correction of
an excessive deficit will lead to another difficult debate within
the Ecofin Council in the future in the event that a State proves
unable for more or less plausible economic reasons to eliminate
an excessive deficit for an extended period of time.
Undeniably, the EDR sets lower standards and a longer procedural timetable, but they may well be seen as justifiable, representing a pragmatic realization that strict compliance rules are
apt to be seriously counterproductive when a State falls into a
recession or near-recession. 324 Also, the revisions can be considered to be worthwhile if their application avoids another political crisis such as the one that confronted the leaders of Europe
in November 2003, precisely when they were trying to construct
a new constitutional structure for the Union. 325 The Amended
EDR certainly marks a shift in enforcement away from a sanction
regime to one relying heavily upon peer support and peer pressure, 26 but is this to be regarded as a radical watering down of
the SGP, or merely a realization that peer pressure is a more
pragmatic and effective manner of enforcement? As we previously noted, the Commission currently appraises peer pressure
and support as one of the key aspects of the preventative arm of
the SGP. However, there is good reason to feel that the
Amended EDR does have one definite deficiency, namely the
continued deliberate omission of any substantive obligation on
States whose total government debt exceeds 60% of GDP to take
on-going annual corrective measures to reduce the debt below
in March 2005 and has been used ever since by critics of the revised rules. See Parker,
supra note 279; see also Doukas, supra note 226, at 311.
324. See Professor De Grauwe's analysis of why the initial rules were counterproductive and apt to intensify recessions in DE GRAuwE, supra note 3, at 238-39.
325. In November 2003, the Intergovernmental Conference preparing the text for
the draft Constitution was unable to reach agreement on several key issues, notably the
voting system for the Council, which were accordingly being held for resolution for the
December European Council meeting, where the debate on these issues in fact proved
both bitter and inconclusive. Further enforcement action in the excessive deficit procedure against France and Germany, both deeply concerned by the unresolved Constitution issues, can certainly be considered to be an unwelcome distraction.
326. Both the Commission Communication, supra note 265, COM (2004) 581 Final and the Council in its Report, discussed at supra note 290 and accompanying text,
relied heavily on this soft law mode of enforcement. Commentators are agreed that
peer support and peer pressure are crucial in the Amended EDR's enforcement procedure, whether or not they agree on its likelihood of success. See Louis, supra note 255, at
101, 105-06.
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Overall, the Amended EDR unquestionably softens considerably the rigorous application of substantive standards and procedures set out in the initial 1997 EDR. Whether this represents
a step forward or backward, and whether the potential benefits
outweigh the risks, is, of course, a subject of a decided difference
of opinion. The initial appraisal in this Article is that the revisions are on the whole decidedly beneficial, both improving the
future application of the SGP rules and bringing about a better
balance between fiscal stability and economic growth concerns.
In any event, a more definitive appraisal of the merits and deficiencies of the revised rules should certainly examine the operational experience in 2005-07, which considerations of length do
not permit in the present Article.
CONCLUSION
One of the goals of this Article was to support the thesis in
Part I that the European Council, and hence the political leaders
of the EU, did indeed intend the SGP to serve to achieve both
stability and growth interests. Finance Ministers may often emphasize the stability aspect, as obviously the ECB and national
central bankers would, but Presidents and Prime Ministers (not
to mention Employment Ministers) are naturally more apt to see
the attainment of both as valid concerns, and even stress economic growth and the promotion of employment at times. The
description of events in 2002-04 in Part III describe the circumstances leading to the bitter conflict between the Commission on
the one hand, supported by the Central Bank and some Member
States, and France, Germany and Italy on the other, a conflict
largely occasioned because the initial EDR set such a premium
on stability and did not permit sufficient flexibility when the political leaders of the States concerned felt that they had to promote their economic growth and combat unemployment at a
time of recession or anemic growth.
Conflicts between the Commission and the Council are always unfortunate in any field, but this is particularly true in that
327. Louis, supra note 255, at 93-94, observes that the size of the total government
debt is a factor in the surveillance process, but the Amended EDR "failed to concretize
[any] obligations" to reduce the debt, presumably due to the opposition of "a minority
of influential Member States."
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of economic coordination, given the impact of national economic conditions upon overall political views and indeed the
opinions of the people at large concerning the role and value of
the Community. Moreover, the timing was particularly unfortunate, because the 2003 conflict brought serious stress in relations
among Member States precisely at the time that their political
leaders had sharp differences of views on provisions in the draft
Constitution, notably the system of voting in the Council. For
this reason, this Article has stressed the importance of the reconciliation represented by the compromise between the Commission and the Council in the drafting of the text of the amended
regulations and by the policy emphasis upon "close and constructive cooperation between the two institutions."
The analysis of the Court' s 2004 judgment in the proceeding between the Commission and the Council notes the beneficial doctrinal examination made by the Court of EC Treaty Article 104 and the SGP. This Article contends that the Council
gained the most from the judgment, because the Court recognized the Council's ultimate decision-making discretion in the
various phases of the excessive deficit procedure. It is certainly
true that the Council must commence its review of any State's
budgetary condition upon the basis of the Commission's evaluations and recommendations, which gives the Commission a crucial role, particularly because of its greater capacity to provide
expert appraisals. Ultimately, however, the Council has discretional autonomy in its decisions, which may be founded on its
own assessment of the economic facts as well as relevant political
considerations. The analysis in Part IV also emphasizes that the
Court's judgment rests on its examination of the Treaty, and
hence is constitutional in nature, in contrast to one based on the
interpretation of the EDR, which is only secondary legislation.
The Article also takes the view that this appraisal of the Council
role is quite warranted, because the excessive deficit procedure
falls within the economic coordination provisions of the Treaty,
and hence is ultimately inter-governmental in character.
In Part V, the Article examines the revisions to the SGP regulations, together with policy features found in the March 2005
Council Report. Generally speaking, the initial analysis of the
revisions is favorable. Expanding the types of data relevant to
the budgetary process that States must provide, and the Commission and Council evaluate, in the soft law surveillance procedure
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certainly does seem to be sensible and apt to improve the process. The amendments to the EDR are undoubtedly controversial, and some may prove in practice to be undesirable, but the
Article's initial appraisal is that they represent overall a beneficial increase in flexibility in the SGP rules and provide a basis for
improved economic analysis. Even more important, some of the
key revisions significantly shift the balance in the SGP rules to
permit a greater recognition of the importance of economic
growth and employment concerns, and reduce the prior onesided pressure for fiscal stability above all, even in times of recession or anemic growth. Only over time as the revised rules are
tested in periods of anemic growth or recession will it be possible
to reach a more definitive appraisal, but at this point the Article's conclusion is that the revised SGP rules do properly put
growth back into the SGP and provide for a much better balance
between fiscal stability and economic growth concerns.

